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ABSTRACT
This article attempts to examine the impact of European private
law upon the legal system of Cyprus taking into account its mixed
elements and whether these elements have contributed towards a
smooth reception of EU law. While Nikitas Hatzimihail argued in
2013 that it may still be too early to assess the impact of European
Union (EU) law upon the legal system of Cyprus, the financial crisis
and its effects render such an assessment possible. Building upon
Hatzimihail’s work in his effort at understanding a “unique” legal
system by using comparative law theory to understand the doctrinal
development and elaboration of Cyprus law, this article attempts to
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offer its own contribution towards that end, by examining the impact
of EU law upon the enforcement of contracts.
The legal system of Cyprus reaffirms Sir Thomas Smith’s perception of a mixed jurisdiction as a system where civil law and common law doctrines have been received and indeed contend for supremacy. These systems, that Vernon Valentine Palmer described as
forming part of the “third legal family” are considered to be more
receptive of outside influences, while their experience is considered
valuable for the elaboration of a European private law. In this context, the experience of European law reception in Cyprus, particularly the Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive,
proves otherwise. Cyprus courts have given European standards a
common law gloss despite the willingness to partake in European
law.
Keywords: mixed legal systems, comparative private law, unfair
contract terms, harmonized European private law, Cyprus
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the multiplicity of legal sources and the classificatory
vacuum that the previous taxonomies left with certain legal systems,
an attempt was made less than two decades ago to renew the old
research by creating a “living classification.” 1 In this environment,
Vernon Valentine Palmer proposed that mixed jurisdictions form a
third legal family alongside the common law and continental law.
This “novel epistemic move” that is growing with time, managed to
put on the map of comparative law the peripheral systems of South
Africa, Quebec, Scotland, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, thus creating a new field of comparative law. According to Glenn “[t]he
concept of tradition [is] . . . an epistemological concept which is
rooted in what can be called an epistemology of conciliation, as
1. Esin Örücü, Family Trees for Legal Systems: Towards a Contemporary
Approach, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 363
(Mark van Hoecke ed., Hart Publ’g 2004) [hereinafter EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY].
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opposed to an epistemology of conflict.” 2 Mixed legal systems
illustrate how this conciliation takes place. 3
Cyprus has only recently entered the map of comparative
law literature regarding mixed jurisdictions. 4 This was primarily a result of the legal system being falsely categorized as part
of the common law family, overlooking the ever-growing influence of continental law especially in the public law sphere.
While it is true that in order to understand Cyprus law, one
needs to think in common law terms, the influence of Greek
law and legal thinking—as a result also of the role of the national language, which is primarily attached to the continental
legal tradition (Greek language)—is changing the landscape.
The legal elite in recent years, however, is pushing more towards an understanding of the Cyprus legal system as a unique
and intricate legal system and away from the common law ideal
types, arguably as an attempt to maintain their power.
This article is divided in two parts. The first part introduces
the mixed jurisdiction theory and places Cyprus within the discussion; a remark is also made of the idea of mixed legal systems as a model for Europe; it then proceeds with a historical
analysis leading to independence and the current state of the
law. The second part examines the impact of EU law, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (also known as Directive 93/13) and the general framework of consumer protection in Cyprus. The article draws certain conclusions as a result
of the jurisprudence of the courts regarding the Unfair Contract
Terms Directive.

2.

Patrick Glenn, Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions, in EPISTEMOLOGY
at 19-20.
3. Seán P. Donlan, Comparative Law and Hybrid Legal Traditions: An Introduction, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND HYBRID LEGAL TRADITIONS 4 (Eleanor
Cashin-Ritaine, Seán Patrick Donlan & Martin Sychold eds., Swiss Institute of
Comparative Law 2010).
4. Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, Cyprus as a Mixed Legal System, 6 J. CIV. L.
STUD. 95 (2013).
AND METHODOLOGY, id.
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II. MIXED JURISDICTIONS
Destined in a “classificatory limbo” mixed legal systems were
dismissed in all efforts of classification, leading to their marginalization without taking the time to analyze closely the common traits
and shared experiences between them until relatively recently.
Vernon Palmer suggests that as is the case with modern biological
nomenclature, where Carolus Linnaeus in his two Kingdoms approach certain types of organisms (zoophytes) such as the sponge or
coral did not fit into one of those Kingdoms, in comparative legal
scholarship, we experience an analogous situation with the explanation of legal phenomena that are only describable as mixed systems. 5
This dichotomy in comparative legal thinking was the reason for the
emergence of the idea of classical “mixed jurisdiction.” Palmer, in
his work devoted to the comparative treatment of systems such as
South Africa and Scotland, argued that “the unity of the mixed jurisdiction ‘experience’ is palpable from the perspective of the jurists
who live within them.” 6 Jurists within such systems have a close
understanding that stems from their knowledge of civil law, common law, and the English language: “[t]hey speak similar bijural dialects . . . .” 7
Two camps exist in comparative literature consisting of the classical “mixed jurisdiction” studies, which tends to focus on a single
kind of hybrid, namely, the systems that straddle common law and
civil law and, on the other hand, scholars of legal pluralism who use
a more expansive and factually-oriented approach. Palmer and his
predecessors such as Sir Thomas Smith 8 and Frederick Parker Walton, 9 represent the classical conception of mixed systems, which
5. Vernon V. Palmer, Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems, 12 ELEC.
J. COMP. L. (2008). See also Staffan Müller-Wille, Carolus Linnaeus, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://perma.cc/FT32-PH2R.
6. See Palmer, supra note 5, at 2.
7. Id.
8. THOMAS B. SMITH, A SHORT COMMENTARY ON THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND
(W. Green & Son Ltd. 1962).
9. Frederick P. Walton, The Civil Law and the Common Law in Canada, 11
JURID. REV. 282 (1899).
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limits the mixture of laws in Western hybrids; that is a system
equally influenced by the common law and the civil law. Conversely, in more recent times the tendency is to include all elements
of mixity of a system, be it indigenous with exogenous, religious
with customary, western with non-western, in a more pluralist conception that conceives a mixed system as one where two or more
kinds of laws or legal traditions are present. As Esin Örücü points
out, “all legal systems are mixed;” 10 a view shared by Reinhard Zimmermann who argues that “all our national private laws in Europe
today can be described as mixed legal systems.”11 This liberal conception includes a broader pursuit of legal phenomena recognized
by a state, but also includes unrecognized and unofficial laws not
under state control, which constitute the living law.
The justification for the “classical mixed jurisdiction theory” in
limiting the mixture in a western hybrid lies in the deeper measure
of comparability that the comparatist encounters when studying
such systems. Although the liberal conception of mixed systems is
valuable in understanding non-occidental personal laws, its task of
comparing divergent laws is more difficult and less fruitful than
within the classical circle. 12 It transcends the conventional taxonomies of comparative law. Additionally, it is easy to discover five or
six stromata of exogenous elements in a single legal system. Nonetheless, the classical mixed jurisdiction theory conceptualized hybridity in a new classificatory scheme, the third legal family. The
word “family” is used in order to emphasize the “impressive” unity
of these systems, despite their geographical remoteness, diversity of
peoples, cultures, languages, etc. The study of the members of the
third legal family brings to light the common traits and problems as
10. Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?, 12
ELEC. J. COMP. L. 2 (2008). See also Stephen Thomson, Mixed Jurisdiction and
the Scottish Legal Tradition: Reconsidering the Concept of Mixture, 7 J. CIV. L.
STUD. 51 (2014).
11. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, ROMAN LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAW, EUROPEAN LAW 159 (Clarendon Law Lectures, Oxford U. Press 2001).
12. See Palmer, supra note 5.
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well as a similarity in patterns of behavior within their legal systems.
The effort was originally conceived for purposes of convenience,
utility, and explanatory power has indeed flourished and transformed from a one-man band into an “entire orchestra.” It has also
seen the establishment of The World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction
Jurists, an international organization that purports to support further
research in the area.
The specificity of the mixture is the first element that characterizes the
legal systems of the “third legal family.”13 These systems are built upon
the dual foundations of common law and civil law. This dual character of
the law should be acknowledged by the actors and observers within the
system. This constitutes the second characteristic, namely, the psychological element that the dual foundations upon which the system is based are
obvious to an ordinary observer. The final characteristic deals with the
structure of the duality. Civil law dominates in the realm of private law,
while common law in the field of public law. However, cases of reverse
allocation are possible. Cyprus is the prime example, where private law,
with the exception of family law, certain principles of property law and
succession (which are influenced by Greek continental law) follows the
English common law, while public law, with the exception of criminal law
which is directed towards common law stereotypes, is based on continental law.
A. Mixed Jurisdictions as a Model for Europe?
Apart from the internal aspect of understanding the legal system,
mixed legal systems are considered as vital in the context of European private law as the study of legal systems already mixed can provide valuable
lessons for all legal systems within the EU; since through cross-fertilization and horizontal transfers, they will eventually mix to some degree.14
Jan Smits, therefore, submits that the open-endedness of the

13. VERNON V. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD
LEGAL FAMILY 28 et seq. (Vernon V. Palmer ed., Cambridge U. Press 2012).
14. See Örücü, supra note 10, at 12.
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idea of mixed systems as a model for Europe makes it an attractive perspective in the debate about European harmonization of private law. 15 Drawing lessons from the development of
mixed systems poses a number of questions such as “what is
the type of experience that can be drawn?” Is the legal method
of mixed jurisdictions superior to that of “pure” legal systems?
Or is it substantive law that may offer fruitful insights? Smits
reaches the conclusion that it is more likely the negative experience of mixed systems that can provide lessons for the process of European harmonization. 16
Mixed jurisdictions have developed organically, something
which runs counter to the idea of using the experience of such
systems for the drafting of coherent sets of European principles. Smits thesis is based on the theory of regulatory competition, based on which competition for regulation leads to a discovery process for new and potentially more efficient legal
products. 17 Jurisdictional competition on the other hand involves interactions with other jurisdictions that create external
competition for the supply of law. This empirical approach to
cultural diversity allows for an analysis of certain solutions
taken by other legal systems and the evaluation of their

15. Jan M. Smits, Mixed Jurisdictions: Lessons for European Harmonisation?, 12 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2008). See also Hein Kötz, The Value of Mixed Legal
Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 435 (2003-2004) (arguing that the experience of mixed
legal systems may make a significant contribution to the great project of developing a European common law, and perhaps even of a European civil code) [hereinafter Lessons for European Harmonisation?]. See also JAN M. SMITS, THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS TO EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Intersentia
2001) [hereinafter THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS]. Hector
MacQueen traced this idea about the value of mixed jurisdictions back to the
French comparatist Lévy Ullman who observed that “Scots law gives us a picture
of what will be some day the law of the civilized nations, namely a combination
between Anglo-Saxon and the Continental system.” See Hector L. MacQueen,
Scots Law and the Road to the New Ius Commune, Ius Commune Lectures on
European Private Law, 4 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2000) (citing Lévy Ullman).
16. See Smits, Lessons for European Harmonisation?, supra note 15.
17. See Horst Eidenmueller, Collateral Damage: Brexit’s Negative Effects
on Regulatory Competition and Legal Innovation in Private Law (ECGI Law,
Working Paper no. 403, 2018).
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functionality. 18 The belief that was expressed in particular with
Scots law is that it can contribute as a model for the development of
private law in Europe; this was based on the premise that the mixture
is one of quality, and not just that the mixture is of civil law and
common law. 19 Therefore, it is the critical picking and choosing of
these systems from both legal traditions that should be a subject of
further study.
Various explanations were given for the process of legal borrowing namely that selective borrowing is a result of “prestige” 20 or
it may result from a movement of legal systems towards more efficiency; 21 the latter also being influenced by the legal origins thesis,
which explores whether economic performance of a country is the
result of its legal system. Whether legal borrowing is influenced by
one or the other parameters, it is not a conclusive fact. 22 Nevertheless, mixed jurisdictions may provide insights as to the potential of
successfully transplanting a foreign legal instrument. As Agustin
Parise indicates from the case of Louisiana, legal borrowing can lead
to successful results that exert influence in other legislative endeavors. 23 Mixed legal systems can contribute in this debate since they
are arguably more receptive of transplants.
18. On how judges change the law in mixed jurisdictions, see Biagio Andò,
The Role of Judges in the Development of Mixed Legal Systems: The Case of
Malta, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 238 (2011) (presenting the example of Malta).
19. Jan M. Smits, Scotland as a Mixed Jurisdiction and the Development of
European Private Law: Is There Something to Learn from Evolutionary Theory?
7 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2003).
20. As explained by Sacco who argued that “there are two fundamental
causes of imitation: imposition and prestige.” See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment II of II), 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 398 (1991).
21. Raffaele Caterina, Comparative Law and Economics, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 192 (2d ed., Jan M. Smits ed., Edward Elgar
Publ’g 2012).
22. On legal transplantation, see the seminal work of ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed., U. of Georgia
Press 1993).
23. Agustín Parise, A Constant Give and Take: Tracing Legal Borrowings in
the Louisiana Civil Law Experience, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17 (2010). The text
has influenced active and passive legal borrowing in the Americas, Asia and in
Europe.
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B. The Mixed Legal System of Cyprus
Symeonides argued that “the legal system of Cyprus is a paradise
of comparative law,” 24 while Frank Hoffmeister said that Cyprus is
an international and European lawyer’s goldmine. 25 When compared to the more populous mixed jurisdictions, the young legal system of Cyprus can claim less juristic innovation. Nevertheless, it can
also offer interesting case studies of hybridity and mutation of common law and continental legal institutions.26 It is said that such comparative work could help the “beleaguered mixed jurisdictions . . .
overcome their intellectual isolation and assist in efforts to preserve
and maintain the civilian tradition.” 27
As is the case with Cyprus, a number of mixed systems freely
chose to become hybrid (e.g., Israel and Scotland), whereas the majority acted under varying degrees of compulsion. Cyprus resembles
the development of the Israeli legal system as far as post-independence developments are concerned. For example, the structure of the
Constitution transformed the legal system from a purely common
law jurisdiction into a mixed system. 28 The bilingualism of the system and the power politics of the legal elites have strengthened and
challenged its bijurality. The two neighboring legal systems both
have taken the decision to leave all existing common law in place
subject to future amendments and to preserve the rule that lacunae
should be filled from importing rules from the English common law
and equity. The decision to preserve the structure and substance of
the common law, a system that was then associated with oppression
and injustice, has been attributed to the inexperience of the legislature, and the main factor that lead to the so-called anglicization of
24. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System of the Republic of
Cyprus, 78 TUL. L. REV. 442 (2003).
25. FRANK HOFFMEISTER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 239
(Martinus Nijhoff Pubs. 2006).
26. See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 55.
27. Palmer, supra note 5, at 13.
28. See Talia Einhorn, The Common Law Foundations of the Israeli Draft
Civil Code, 80 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 93 (2016).
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the law. 29 However, it has been described as a result of pragmatism
rather than principle, an effort by the founding generations to find
their place in the post-colonial era. As Hatzimihail points out, the
personal biases of the dominant group of colonial advocates played
a major role in the maintenance of the common law. 30
C. Historical Evolution
The Republic of Cyprus, a former colony of the United Kingdom
and a member of the Commonwealth, joined the European Union in
2004. During the year of independence in 1960, the last and only
island-wide official census took place, which estimated the island’s
population at 550,000 people, composed of 81,14% Greek and
18,86% Turkish Cypriots. The latest census regarding the population that resides in the government-controlled area resulted in a population of 864,200, while previous versions estimated that 74,5% of
the population is Greek and 9,8% is Turkish Cypriots. 31 Geographically, Cyprus is closer to Turkey and the Middle East rather than
Greek mainland. As the late Christopher Hitchens put it, “[its] favorable position, within such easy reach of Syria, Turkey and Egypt,
has often been more of a curse than a boon . . . .” 32
Symeon Symeonides correctly points out that the “diverse elements that compose the law of Cyprus owe their origin and survival
to its troubled political history; they are accidents of history.” 33 A
mixed system is by definition suggestive of a turbulent past, but also
of an uncertain future. Cyprus long periods of foreign occupation,
29. Symeonides, supra note 24, 450. See, e.g., the decision of the Polish to
draw upon the Napoleonic Code and the civil codes of Germany and Austria,
which is regarded as an effort not to endorse the legal institutions of a recent occupier. See Beata Gessel & Kalinowska vel Kalisz, Mixing Legal Systems in Europe; the Role of Common Law Transplants (Polish Law Example), 4 EUR. REV.
PRIV. L. 793 (2017).
30. Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 88.
31. For more, see Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus, Demographic Report 2017 (Nov. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/7EVH-5N6K.
32. CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, HOSTAGE TO HISTORY: CYPRUS FROM THE OTTOMANS TO KISSINGER 29 (Verso 1997).
33. See Symeonides, supra note 24, at 454.
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that is still present on the island, formed and is forming its legal system. First, by the inheritance of the common law system and, secondly, by the prevailing sense of interim stage that the legal system
is perceived to be, until Turkish Cypriots return on their posts.
Therefore, the “Cyprus problem” 34 malfunctions have spilled over
in the legal system, while it is uncertain what the impact of a future
political settlement will be. These malfunctions and particularities
might be considered qualities, as they make the legal system of Cyprus intellectually intriguing for comparative lawyers.
The Mycenaeans, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians,
Romans, Byzantines, Crusaders, Lusignans, Venetians, Turks, British, and Alexander the Great have all in turn exercised control and
influence over the island, something that still has an effect in present
day Cyprus, since it is a melting pot of languages, cultures as well
as diverse laws. The most important conquerors of the island that
shaped the present day’s pluralist nature of its legal system are the
Byzantines, Turks, and British, and to a lesser extent the Venetians
and the Lusignans. 35 After the Ottoman rule, which lasted four centuries, leaving its mark on the island, the United Kingdom ceded
Cyprus in 1878 as a “place d’armes,” 36 a product of bargain with

34. The “Cyprus problem” is a term often used to describe the occupation
and de facto division of the island.
35. The Livre des Assises des Bourgeois, which was a collection of customary laws, is one of the most important monuments of European legal history. See
THE ASSIZES OF THE LUSIGNAN KINGDOM OF CYPRUS (Nicholas Coureas trans.,
Cyprus Research Centre 2002). See also Seán P. Donlan, The Mediterranean Hybridity Project: Crossing the Boundaries of Law and Culture, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD.
355 (2011), on the various traditions that represent the extraordinary legal and
normative hybridity of the Mediterranean region as a result of conquest, colonization and social and legal diffusion across shifting and porous political boundaries.
36. WILLIAM MALLINSON, CYPRUS: A MODERN HISTORY 10 (I. B. Tauris
2005). The island had a role of a reserve place d’armes lying on the periphery of
an area of vital concern to Britain. Historical evidence suggest that Cyprus would
only acquire importance if Britain evacuated Egypt. Therefore, the island was not
considered definitely useless, but it was also not disposable. See GEORGE S. GEORGHALLIDES, A POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF CYPRUS, 1918-1926
14 (Cyprus Research Centre 1979).
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the weakened Ottoman Empire in return for protection against the
expansionist aims of Russia. 37
As regards the legal system, despite the gradual introduction of the
common law in Cyprus, certain laws that were introduced by the Tanzimat movement and initiated by the Ottomans still remained in force,
such as the communal administration of justice system, an element that
comes closer to the classic definition of a mixed jurisdiction even during
the colonial era.38 During Ottoman rule, the Commercial Code of 1850,
the Criminal Code of 1858, and the Maritime Code of 1863, which were
introduced in Cyprus, were based on the respective French codes. With
the 1878 Supplementary Agreement to the Cyprus Convention that
stripped the Sultan of all his substantive powers over the island, the
Queen of England was invested with “full powers for making Laws and
Conventions for the Government of the Island of Cyprus in her Majesty’s name, and for the regulation of its Commercial and Consular relations and affairs free from the Porte’s control.”39 Britain introduced a
series of reforms such as the independent currency system, the abolition
of capitulations and consular courts, the establishment of a new judicial
organization, and the enactment of a representative Legislative Council.40 Until 1935, when common law almost entirely replaced Ottoman
law, the residual law of the country was implemented making recourse
to English law to avoid manifest injustice and to fill gaps in the law.41
37. See GEORGHALLIDES, supra note 36, at 4 et seq. In June 4, 1878, Sir
Austen Layard and Safvet Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, signed an AngloTurkish Convention of Defensive Alliance which stipulated that Britain would go
to Turkey’s assistance in the vent of the renewal of Russian attacks in Asiatic
Turkey and the occupation and administration of Cyprus to be given to Britain in
order to be able to carry out its military obligations to Turkey. See also Andreas
Neocleous & David Bevir, Legal History, in INTRODUCTION TO CYPRUS LAW 6
(Dennis Campbell ed., A. Neocleous & Co., Yorkhill Law Publ’g 2000) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO CYPRUS LAW].
38. See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 40.
39. Correspondence respecting the Island of Cyprus, C. 2229, London
(1879). See also GEORGHALLIDES, supra note 36, at 11.
40. Id. According to Georghallides, the enactment of the Council came in
spite of the protests by the Turkish Cypriot leaders and the Porte.
41. See section 1202 of the Mejelle (Civil Code of the Ottoman Empire): “It
is considered as a great nuisance that a place used by women such as the kitchen,
the mouth of the well and the yard of a house should be seen.” See also Hassan
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During that period, English judges applied English rules of interpretation of the law, giving a new dimension to its application—what Hatzimihail calls mutation. 42
Ottoman law was partly preserved by the British by recognizing the jurisdiction of the Moslem Religious Courts to adjudicate matters of personal status of the Muslim inhabitants of
the island, 43 while Byzantine law was preserved through the
recognition of the jurisdiction of the Episcopal Courts and the
law-making authority of the Orthodox church for matters of
personal status of the Greek Orthodox inhabitants. 44 The

Erikzade v. Georghi Arghiro (1890) 1 C.L.R. 84, the court noted that (emphasis
added):
Now it is to be observed that, prima facie, a man is entitled to use his
property in any way he pleases; and he is further entitled to the free access of light and air to his property unless his rights are restricted by any
law, or unless the owner of adjoining property has acquired some easement recognized by the law, which interferes with the free exercise of
these rights. Such a restriction on the natural right of a man to make use
of his property in any way he pleases, is contained in the section of the
Mejelle last above referred to, and we consider that in construing a law,
which is restrictive of the natural rights of individuals, a strict construction must be placed upon it, that is to say, we must construe it in such a
way that the enjoyment of his property by the defendant shall be interfered with as little as possible.
Therefore, Section 1202 of the Mejelle was interpreted in line with English law
to avoid manifest injustice. See also GEORGE M. PIKIS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND THEIR APPLICATION IN A FORMER BRITISH COLONY, CYPRUS 73 (Brill Nijhoff 2017).
42. See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 38.
43. Article I of the Annex to the 1878 Convention obliged Britain to ensure
that Moslem Sheri Law would be administered by special courts in religious and
family matters affecting the members of the Turkish community, establishing
“[t]hat a Mussulman religious Tribunal (Mehkeme-I Sheri) shall continue to exist
in the island, which will take exclusive cognizance of religious matters, and of no
others, concerning the Mussulman population of the island.” See The Cyprus Convention, Convention of Defensive Alliance Between Great Britain and Turkey
with Respect of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, U.K.-Turk., June 4, 1878. Georghallides points out that, unlike the religious courts of the Greek Orthodox
Church, the Moslem courts continued to have all their expenses defrayed by the
Cyprus budget. See GEORGHALLIDES, supra note 36, at 358.
44. A similar approach was followed in India. See GILLES CUNIBERTI,
GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS 398 (2d ed., Lextenso 2011). The
composition of the Supreme Court was a subject of contention in 1925 since it
consisted of two British Judges, the Greek elected members of the Legislative
Council argued that such a composition was deprived of detailed knowledge of
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essential characteristics of the millet system were thus maintained and the British administrator modernized the faith-groups as
ethnic communities, transforming at the same time the “quasi-medieval community elites into ‘ethno-communal elites’ . . . .” 45 The millet was a form of indirect rule according to religious difference
adopted by the Ottomans. 46
In 1925, Cyprus formally became a British colony and English
substantive law began its conquest of the land. The gradual imposition of common law over the legal system, a policy of “structured
mixité” 47 was based on the rule of international law that provides
that the laws of a conquered country continue in force, until they are
altered by the conqueror. 48 Palmer suggests that neither British nor
American decision makers based their policies on this rule; rather
they exercised discretion taking into account demographic, political,
and social factors such as introducing foreign language to an uncomprehending population. 49 This may be shown in the judgment of
Chief Justice Hallinan in Universal Advertising and Publishing
Agency v. Panayiota A. Vouros, 50 where it was stressed that the
local habits, customs and laws such as of Moslem religious and Greek canon law.
See GEORGHALLIDES, supra note 36, at 358.
45. Nicos Trimikliniotis, Nationality and Citizenship in Cyprus Since 1945:
Communal Citizenship, Gendered Nationality and the Adventures of a Post-Colonial Subject in a Divided Country, in CITIZENSHIP POLICIES IN THE NEW EUROPE
391 (Rainer Bauböck, Bernhard Perchinig & Wiebke Sievers eds., Amsterdam U.
Press 2009).
46. Karen Barkey & George Gavrilis, The Ottoman Millet System: Non-Territorial Autonomy and Its Contemporary Legacy, 15 ETHNOPOLITICS 26 (2016).
47. Patrick H. Glenn, Quebec: Mixité and Monism, in STUDIES IN LEGAL
SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING 3-8 (Esin Örücü, Elspeth Attwool & Sean Coyle
eds., Kluwer Law Int’l 1996).
48. Campbell v. Hall (1774) 1 Cowp. All ER Rep 252 1045, at 1047, as per
Lord Mansfield: “The laws of a conquered country continue in force, until they
are altered by the conqueror.” Under the common law doctrine of reception, the
laws of a conquered or ceded territory remained in force unless and until they are
altered by the conquering nation. See Ulla Secher, The Mabo Decision—Preserving the Distinction Between ‘Settled’ and ‘Conquered or Ceded’ Territories, 24
UQ LAW J 35 (2005). See Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) [hereinafter Mabo case]
HCA 23; 175 CLR 1, 35 (1992).
49. PALMER, supra note 13, at 28.
50. Universal Advertising and Publishing Agency v. Panayiota A. Vouros,
19 C.L.R. 87, 94 (1957) [hereinafter Universal Advertising and Publishing
Agency].
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principles of the common law of England do not fit Cyprus in their
totality. 51
According to Christian Burset, the political reasons behind such
policies is the belief, on the one hand, that by withholding English
law, the Empire kept the colonies culturally isolated, economically
dependent, and politically docile; on the other hand, that Britain
should govern all colonies based on a global common law that
would both reflect and promote the equality of all British subjects. 52
Applying the legal origins perspective to such distinct approaches to
legal transplantation, in particular, the view that the common law is
more favorable to free markets and supports a less statist approach
to governing, Burset argues that the proponents of withholding English law did so as such imposition would bar the door to government
intervention. 53 English law provided important protections against
authoritarianism and expropriation. On the other hand, the supporters of a global common law wanted a legal system that supported a
particular political-economic agenda.
The gradual imposition of English law in Cyprus can be
explained from a policy standpoint since Cyprus was initially
regarded as an “inconsequential possession,” while at a later stage it
acquired a heightened role as a result of the importance of its
geographical position in defending the Suez Canal. 54 English
common law totally replaced the pre-existing legal system until
independence when the island was regarded as a definite member of
the common law tradition. 55 This illustrates that conquest itself,
51. See PIKIS, supra note 41, at 75.
52. Christian R. Burset, Why Didn’t the Common Law Follow the Flag? 105
VA. L. REV. 483, 535 (2019).
53. Id. at 50.
54. ANDREKOS VARNAVA, BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN CYPRUS, 1878-1915:
THE INCONSEQUENTIAL POSSESSION (Manchester U. Press 2009). See also GEORGHALLIDES, supra note 36, at 10.
55. Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, Reconstructing Mixity: Sources of Law and Legal
Method in Cyprus, in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS, EAST AND WEST 75 (Vernon V.
Palmer, Mohamed Y. Mattar & Anna Koppel eds., Routledge 2016). From the
Tanzimat reformation, the Penal Code remained in force until 1928, the Commercial Code until 1930, and the Ottoman Land Code until 1946.
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while indeed a “triggering event” of legal change, does not create a
mixed jurisdiction. 56
The principle of binding precedent was applicable in the same
spirit as in England. Therefore, decisions of the High Court were
binding on first instance courts, whereas the High Court of Cyprus
was bound by decisions of the Privy Council. Decisions of the High
Court of Cyprus were appealable before the Privy Council. First instance decisions of the English High Court were of persuasive authority. According to George Pikis, decisions of the High Court of
Cyprus were assimilated in terms of binding precedent to first instance decisions of the High Court of England. 57 The Courts of Justice Order of 1935 set forth that the common law and principles of
equity as they stood in England in 1914 were applicable. This provision, according to Pikis, was ignored as the assimilation of the decisions to those of the High Court of England indicates. This has
resulted in a failure of adjusting the common law and principles of
equity to the needs of Cyprus and the idiosyncrasy of its people notwithstanding the fact that common law is a living body meant to
respond to the living needs of society. 58
Chief Justice Hallinan underlined in the Universal Advertising
and Publishing Agency 59 case that the common law must be transplanted in Cyprus as a living organism, with the necessary legal and
judicial adjustments to meet the needs of the people of Cyprus.
Pikis, in emphasizing Lord Denning’s dicta in Nyali Ltd.. v. Attorney
General, 60 where he stressed that the common law cannot be applied
in a foreign land without considerable qualification, argues that little
effort was made in that direction. Lord Denning stressed that, just as
with an English oak, although the English common law will flourish
in a foreign land, it will need careful tending. The common law, according to Lord Denning, “has many principles of manifest justice
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

PALMER, supra note 13, at 30.
See PIKIS, supra note 41, at 74.
Id.
Universal Advertising and Publishing Agency, supra note 50.
Nyali Ltd.. v. Attorney General (1956) 1 Q.B. 16.
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and good sense which can be applied with advantage to peoples of
every race and colour all the world over: but it has also many refinements, subtleties and technicalities which are not suited to other
folk. These off-shoots must be cut away.”
In post-independence Cyprus, such adjustments have been
made, in limited cases though, as is seen from cases such as KEM
(Taxi) Ltd. v. Anastasis Tryphonos, 61 where it was emphasized that
the reaction of employer and employee in the context of a labor dispute in Cyprus may take different form from a corresponding reaction in England.
Consequently, since 1945 Cypriots are the only Europeans to
have undergone colonial rule, guerilla war, civil war, and modern
technological war on their soil. 62 Also, as of 1945 and onwards, the
struggle for enosis (unification with Greece) and the demand for
freedom and self-determination was renewed. 63 To counter any anticolonial movements, the British offered constitutional proposals
that were rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The subversive organization of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was
formed and an armed rebellion began in 1955 and lasted until 1959,
a few days before Cyprus gained the status of an independent state.
The British colonial rule suppressed civil liberties and imposed
harsh reprisals, while reinforcing Turkish radicalization and claims
to partition the island as a counterweight to the struggle for unification with Greece. 64 The Zurich-London Accords of 1960, despite
different aspirations, imposed independence on the people of Cyprus. 65 According to late President Makarios, this marked the
61. KEM (Taxi) Ltd. v. Anastasis Tryphonos (1969) 1 C.L.R. 52.
62. HITCHENS, supra note 32, at 12.
63. Neocleous & Bevir, supra note 37, at 7.
64. See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 48; MALLINSON, supra note 36, at 31
et seq.
65. See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 48. According to Polyviou, the thesis
about “an imposed settlement” was advanced in numerous legal opinions, letters
and notes prepared and issued by the then Attorney General of the Republic of
Cyprus, Mr Criton Tornaritis, from 1961 onwards. See POLYVIOS G. POLYVIOU,
CYPRUS: A STUDY IN THE THEORY, STRUCTURE AND METHOD OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 8 (Cryssafinis & Polyviou 2015).
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creation of a state but not of a nation. The notion of a nation-state, a
term that presupposes the congruence of a particular ethnic group
and a territory, 66 is therefore absent from the outset. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was attached to these agreements; a
constitution that is argued to be drafted by a joint committee of
Greek and Turkish Cypriot jurists. However, its travaux préparatoires are yet to be published. 67 Since Cypriots had a minimal role
in drafting it, few felt it to be sacred. 68 The Constitution divided the
citizens of the republic into a Greek and Turkish community and
provided for a binary/bi-communal government with presidential
characteristics in a consociational system. 69 This model of government is akin to federalism, as it distributes political authority on a
functional or personal basis. 70
The Constitution has been characterized as one of the most peculiar in the constitutional world. 71 It is a rather lengthy instrument
with several provisions having the character of fundamental, basic
articles, not capable of any revision or amendment. 72 Accordingly,
the Constitution has been described as: “probably the most rigid in
66. Alison D. Renteln, Ethnicity, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford U. Press 2011).
67. See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 48.
68. HITCHENS, supra note 32, at 55.
69. The consociational model was derived from the political experience of
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. As to the democratic system,
it represents the complement of the Anglo-American model. AREND LIJPHART,
DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 6 (Yale U.
Press 1977). See also Carleton W. Sterling, Consociational Democracy, 40 REV.
POL. 303 (1978).
70. George E. Devenish, Federalism Revisited: The South African Paradigm, 17 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 129 (2006).
71. Pavlos Neofytou Kourtellos, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO
CYPRUS LAW, supra note 37, at 16. Jan Smits measures complexity in law by
looking at the different factors of density, technicality, institutional differentiation
and indeterminacy and finds that the Constitution of Cyprus is highly difficult to
understand, while in general, the legal system scores high on complexity. Jan M.
Smits, Do Small Jurisdictions Have a More Complex Law? A Numerical Experiment in Constitutional and Private Law (Maastricht European Private Law Institute, Working Paper no. 2015/05, 2015).
72. According to Tornaritis (Attorney General from 1960 to 1984) “such
provisions are contrary to the accepted principles of public law and the current
constitutional practice.” See CRITON TORNARITIS, CYPRUS AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER LEGAL PROBLEMS 55 (Proodos Ltd. 1977).
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the world. It is certainly the most detailed and . . . most complicated.
It is weighed down by checks and balances, procedural and substantive safeguards, guarantees and prohibitions. Constitutionalism has
run riot in harness with Communalism.” 73
The bi-communal administration was unfortunately short-lived,
as three years after independence, the republic was faced with a major political and constitutional crisis after the departure of the Turkish Cypriots from their posts in the executive and legislative functions. 74 Their withdrawal was the result of the proposal for constitutional amendments by President Makarios to remove obstacles to the
smooth functioning of the State. After the presentation of these proposals, inter-communal violence broke out. The majority of the
members of the Turkish Cypriot community were secluded into enclaves with strong lines of defense. 75 The proper functioning of the
state was made possible thanks to the doctrine of necessity. This
doctrine provides that when the compliance with constitutional provisions is rendered impossible due to the exceptional and unforeseen
circumstances, which the framers of the Constitution never contemplated (e.g., the non-participation of Turkish Cypriots in the institutions of the republic), the relevant constitutional provisions are
deemed to be amended so that the state can avoid complete paralysis. 76

73.

STANLEY A. DE SMITH, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH AND ITS CONSTITU285 (Stevens 1964).
74. The Turkish Cypriot judges remained in their posts for a few more years,
while the Turkish Cypriot High Court Judge Mehmet Zekia became the united
Supreme Court’s (merged Supreme Constitutional Court and High Court) first
President and first Cypriot judge at the European Court of Human Rights. See
Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 67.
75. NIKOS SKOUTARIS, THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A MEMBER STATE UNDER SIEGE 24 (Hart Publ’g 2011).
76. Particularly, it was held that the Constitution can be amended by a law
passed by a majority of two-thirds of the Greek Cypriot members of the House of
Representatives alone. See Nicolaou v. Nicolaou (1992) 1 C.L.R. 1338. See also
Constantinos Lykourgos, Cyprus Public Law as Affected by Accession to the European Union, in STUDIES IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW: THEMATIC, NATIONAL AND
POST-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 103 (Constantinos Kombos ed., Sakkoulas Publications 2010).
TIONS

114

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 12

From 1963 until 1974, the two communities were engaged in
negotiations to find a comprehensive and viable solution for the island. However, a coup d’état, orchestrated by the military junta of
Greece that upset legality, was used as a pretext by Turkey to invade
the island, causing a humanitarian catastrophe and establishing a geographical and ethnical division. Turkey seized approximately 36%
of the territory of Cyprus and expelled approximately 170,000
Greek Cypriots from their lawful residences. 77 Turkey based its operation on article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, which provides that
the guarantor states (Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) have
the “right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state
of affairs.” The “right of action” was thus interpreted as the right to
use force unilaterally, which is expressly prohibited under article
2(4) of the UN Charter. 78 The Security Council expressed “its formal
disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus.”79 On November 15, 1983, the self-proclaimed “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) emerged as the “exercise of
self-determination” of the Turkish Cypriots.80 The UN Security Council
deplored the “secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus”81 and called
upon all states not to recognize the purported state “set up by secessionist
acts.”82 The unlawfulness of the TRNC has been consistently dealt with
by legal means from the first moment. It was also upheld by the European
Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice.83
77. In what regards the island’s territory, 59,5% is under the control of the
Republic of Cyprus, 35,2% under Turkish occupation and 2,6% is the buffer zone,
while 2,7% constitute British sovereign bases.
78. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
53: “A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law.”
79. S.C. Res. 360 (Aug. 16, 1974).
80. According to de Wet, no general right of a minority to secede has been
recognized in international law. ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 328 (Studies in International Law, Hart
Publ’g 2004).
81. S.C. Res. 541 (Nov. 18, 1983).
82. S.C. Res. 550 (May 11, 1984).
83. See European Court of Human Rights, Cyprus v. Turkey, application no.
25781/94, May 12, 2014. See also International Court of Justice, Accordance with
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Nevertheless, talks continued with an aim to find a comprehensive
and viable solution in the context of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation and end this unprecedented political anomaly. To this day, and
despite ongoing talks, Turkey’s military holds 36% of the territory.
While the bi-communal structure of the Republic of Cyprus functions according to the doctrine of necessity, the Turkish Cypriot
community is expected to return and reclaim their seats, once it is
set free from Turkey. 84
D. The Legal System
Two ideas usually exist for Cyprus: first that of an insular paradise, the birthplace of Aphrodite, the perfect beaches and mountains,
the olive groves, the gentle people, and the wine-dark sea; and secondly that of an unprecedented political anomaly, often seen as an
insoluble Gordian Knot. In this vivid imagery that author Christopher Hitchens used to describe Cyprus, 85 two ideas can be added: its
legal system and the recent financial crisis that led to the first time
when creditors (and even depositors) of a bank were called upon to
finance the banks’ deficit (the so-called bail-in). 86
The elements that make up Cyprus law are reversely allocated
compared to other mixed jurisdictions 87 presenting into the theory
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, July 22, 2010, no. 141, § 81.
84. See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 51. Turkish Cypriot property in the area
controlled by the republic is held in trust by the government, pending resolution
of the Cyprus problem. See Turkish Cypriot Properties (Management and Other
Topics) Law L. 139/91.
85. HITCHENS, supra note 32, at 19.
86. For the legal implications, see Myron M. Nicolatos (President of the Supreme Court of Cyprus, Substitute Member of the Venice Commission), European
Commission for Democracy Through Law, Austerity Measures and Economic
Crisis. The Case of Cyprus—A Judge’s approach (2014).
87. See also Agustín Parise, Codification of the Law in Louisiana: Early
Nineteenth-Century Oscillation Between Continental European and Common
Law Systems, 27 TULANE EUR. CIV. L. FORUM (2012) (looking at the codification
endeavors that took place in Louisiana during the early American period until
before the developments of the Civil War, where the drafters were representatives
of both continental European and common law traditions that resulted in an “eclectic work”).
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of mixed jurisdiction with a “juridical unicorn,” i.e., common law
has a stronghold in private law with the exception of non-commercial matters and criminal law, whereas public law is based on civilian stereotypes. Procedural law follows common law as all other
mixed jurisdictions. However, in the case of Cyprus, it is vital to
think in common law terms in order to understand Cyprus law.88
Procedural law has acted as a vehicle for the introduction of common law notions into areas of substantive law that are oriented towards the continental legal tradition, and for ensuring the persistence of a common law mentality. 89 Thus, the legal system of Cyprus reaffirms Sir Thomas Smith’s perception that a mixed jurisdiction is a system where civil law and common law doctrines have
been received and indeed contend for supremacy. 90
Cyprus more closely resembles a common law jurisdiction than
other mixed jurisdictions; however, the civilian influence is constantly expanding in new areas of the law. Additionally, most of the
legislation has been imported or transplanted from abroad. According to Hatzimihail, this importation has often resulted in veritable
transplants, while in other instances resulted in the formation of altered legal regimes, evoking Gunther Teubner’s idea of legal irritants. 91 For example, the courts have given the principle of good
faith, provided under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, a common law gloss by focusing on an absence of dishonesty in agreeing
upon the terms. All this adds to the amazingly complex picture of a
unique legal system that Hatzimihail envisaged.
The journey of mixedness of Cyprus law has taken a “contrariwise movement,” 92 since the common law has emigrated rather than
88. Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, On Law, Legal Elites and the Legal Profession
in a (Biggish) Small State: Cyprus, in SMALL STATES IN A LEGAL WORLD 217
(Petra Butler & Caroline Morris eds., Springer 2017).
89. Id. at 228.
90. Thomas B. Smith, Property and Trust, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (René David et al. eds., Tübingen 1972).
91. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
92. PALMER, supra note 13, at 9.
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migrated as in almost all mixed jurisdictions. Apart from the fact
that Cyprus law tends to agree on terms of constitutional form, the
principles of separation of powers, the independence of the judge,
judicial review of governmental acts, due process of law, free
speech, and freedom from arbitrary search and arrest, public law is
strongly influenced by Greek administrative law. 93 Moreover, the
constitution provided under article 146 for a separate Constitutional
Court with original jurisdiction over administrative law cases. The
principle of ne bis in idem or “double jeopardy,” which is of continental origin, is also applicable via article 12.2 of the Constitution
of Cyprus. 94
This allocation arose from constitutional provisions such as article 146, which establishes jurisdiction over petitions to annul or
confirm administrative acts in the spirit of the French recours en
annulation. Another example is article 188 of the Constitution; this
provision states that the laws applicable until independence will
continue to be in force and be interpreted in line with the Constitution as well as organic laws such as the Courts of Justice Law, which
provided for the common law doctrines of equity 95 to be sources of
law unless otherwise provided for by law or the Constitution,
thereby confirming the colonial status quo. 96 As Hatzimihail points
out, independence should have led Cyprus away from the common
law tradition as it empowered a people attached to motherlands and
languages falling firmly within the continental legal tradition. Nevertheless, it confirmed the place of the colonial legal, business, and
administrative elite as well as its capacity to absorb new entrants, a
form of rent-seeking as explained by Anthony Ogus. 97
93. Greek administrative law is based on French doctrine, see EPAMINONDAS
SPILIOTOPOULOS, GREEK ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Ant. N. Sakkoulas 2004).
94. See Attorney General (Article 7) (1993) 1 C.L.R. 793.
95. Translated as principles of equity.
96. See Courts of Justice Law no. 14/60 (1960), art. 29 [hereinafter Courts
of Justice Law].
97. See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 216. See Anthony Ogus, The Contribution of Economic Analysis of Law to Legal Transplants, in THE CONTRIBUTION
OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 15.
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According to Symeonides, this statute passed by an inexperienced House of Representatives went much further than the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, tying the legal system of Cyprus in a
permanent and surreptitious manner to the English common law.98
This provision had no temporal limitation; hence, it authorized the
application of post-independence common law along with pre-independence laws. It also made common law binding rather than persuasive upon courts leading to the so-called anglicization of the
law. 99 However, the republic was born in “an uneasy truce between
realities and aspirations,” with the various social groups and legal
and political elites trying to find their place in the post-colonial
era. 100 In any case, the institutional arrangements would have disallowed significant law reform as the sharing of power proved already
problematic in 1963 when the Turkish members of the House of
Representatives rejected the budget. 101 The decision for maintenance of the status quo was, therefore, the easy way out, as it left
the option for a future law reform, on which there was no consensus
at the time and did not have the intellectual structure to begin
with. 102 However, as former Judge Pikis points out:
The inheritance of English law in Cyprus had positive effects
in relation to human rights, including property rights. It is no
coincidence that despite the blows inflicted upon Cyprus in
1974, the rule of law retained its force, the State survived,
helping in the sustenance of the Republic of Cyprus becoming in due course a member of the European Union. 103
It is obvious that personal biases of the dominant group of colonial advocates played a major role in the maintenance of the common law. 104 Following independence, Cyprus Bar membership
98. The task was undertaken by a well-known former servant of Her Majesty’s government according to Symeonides, supra note 24, at 450.
99. Id.
100. See Hatzimihail, supra note 55.
101. See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 216.
102. See Hatzimihail, supra note 55.
103. See PIKIS, supra note 41, at 98 (emphasis added).
104. For the last thirty years of Colonial rule, membership to the Cyprus Bar
had been preserved for barristers trained in England. See Advocates Law (Cap. 2)
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begun expanding significantly, with a new wave of lawyers coming
from non-legal families and holders of university degrees from
Greek law schools. This resulted in a cultural conflict, with traces
that are still visible today. Maintenance of the English common law
became a vehicle for the dominance of the established group of colonial advocates, and their children, in the emerging legal profession
of Cyprus. 105 But this internal conflict is best illustrated in the use
of the English language: it took three decades after independence for
the legal system to complete the transition from English to the republic’s official languages. Hatzimihail stresses that perhaps it is not
mere coincidence that it took a little more than three decades after
independence for the first Cypriot graduates of a Greek law school
to reach the appellate bench. Be that as it may, this did not act as an
obstacle for a unique Cypriot legal identity to be formed, shifting
away from common law ideal types. 106
E. Contract and Commercial Law
Cyprus commercial and contract law is patterned after English
statutory models. The majority of mixed jurisdictions at their
founding had a civilian-based commercial law, which was later
taken over by common law rules mainly based on the idea that the
requirements of commerce are best served via common law rules
and that old commercial law was inadequate to cope with them.107
(1955), art. 3: admission to practice as an advocate was reserved to those “entitled
to practice” as a barrister-at-law or “admitted to practice” as a solicitor in England
or Northern Ireland, or as an advocate in Scotland. See also Hatzimihail, supra
note 55.
105. Hatzimihail stresses that the most influential groups within the legal profession—appellate judges and the notables that used to belong to families that
trace their origins in the profession to the colonial-era advocates—are the ones
who most closely identify with the common law. Therefore, these groups had a
vested right to act as gatekeepers and refrain from opening the system to new
entrants who were educated in Greece. See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 234.
106. See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 242.
107. Id. at 92. See also Jacques du Plessis, Common Law Influences on the
Law of Contract and Unjustified Enrichment in Some Mixed Legal Systems, 78
TUL. L. REV. 219 (2016). Du Plessis examines the common law influence with
regards to causa and consideration, promissory estoppel and reasonable reliance,
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New legislation in Cyprus relating to contract law simply replaced
previous English statutory transplants as is the case with the Sale of
Goods Act. 108 The dominance of English contract and commercial
law is evident from the fact that legislative deviations from the
English paradigm such as the Vienna Convention on the Sale of
Goods, also known as the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 109 as well as statutes
implementing EU derivative law, are only absorbed very gradually
in legal practice and caselaw. 110 Despite the fact that the Vienna
Convention on the Sale of Goods entered into force over a decade
ago in Cyprus—which could have led to an autonomous source of
law with its own interpretation and application, separate from the
common law—the CISG has yet to generate any caselaw. 111 It may
be argued that this reflects a preference towards the English law of
sale, which is preferred as the governing law in international
sales. 112
The impact of EU derivative law is just beginning to be felt in
contractual practice and caselaw, mainly through the Unfair

offer, acceptance and the mailbox theory, undue influence and good faith,
anticipatory breach and repudiation and the condictio indebiti.
108. See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 227-28. New legislation on Sale of
Goods enacted in 1994 (L. 10(I)/1994) replaced the English Sale of Goods Act of
1893 (applicable under Sale of Goods Law (Cap. 267), L.25/1953) with the English Sale of Goods Act of 1979.
109. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG), 1980. According to Rogowska, the English legal system has
achieved wide international acceptance and familiarity since, despite the advantages of the CISG, business parties worldwide have frequently incorporated
English law into their international sales contracts. See Anna Rogowska, Some
Considerations on the Desirability of Accession to the CISG by the UK, 2 ELEC.
J. COMP. L. (2013).
110. Id. at 228.
111. Id. According to Hatzimihail, even legal literature makes no reference of
the CISG being applicable in Cyprus. See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 228. The
absence of caselaw on the CISG can be seen by the data available on the “Case
Law on UNCITRAL Texts” (CLOUT) of UNCITRAL, https://perma.cc/6V6KXDY3.
112. Min Yan, Remedies Under the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the United Kingdom’s Sale of Goods Act: A Comparative
Examination, 3 CITY U. H.K. L. REV. 111 (2011).
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Contract Terms Directive. 113 Directive 93/13 was implemented already prior to accession. However, the prohibition against unfair
terms has only recently started to excerpt influence in contracts,
while discussions are being held for a possible extension of the fairness clause to SMEs. 114 Effective consumer protection, though, is
still in its early stages. This contrasts with the inroads that the principle of good faith has made into English caselaw. 115 The reasoning
in most contract cases in Cyprus, however, is not comparable to appellate English opinions. 116
Article 29(1)(c) of the Courts of Justice Law provides that the
applicable law in Cyprus is the common law and the principles of
equity. 117 However, the hybrid nature of the law is emphasized by
the fact that the starting point for the development of judicially constructed rules is the codified legislation. The law of contract in Cyprus is contained in Chapter 149 of the Laws of Cyprus (also known
as Cap. 149) originally enacted in 1957, which is effectively a transplant of the Indian Contract Act of 1872. 118 According to Hatzimihail, the primary differences between the two texts are technical: certain explanations were moved into the main text, illustrations have been removed, and specific performance is provided for

113. See Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L95) (EC), on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts [hereinafter Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive].
114. French law prohibits contractual clauses that create a significant imbalance between the parties’ rights and obligations arising under a contract. This
concept is defined by reference to lesion originating from consumer law—and
was later extended to commercial law and to general contract law with the French
revision of obligations by Ordinance no. 2016-131, Feb. 10, 2016. See also David
R. Amariles, Eva M. Bassilana & Matteo Winkler, The Impact of the French Doctrine of Significant Imbalance on International Business Transactions, 2 J. BUS.
L. 149 (2018).
115. See Yam Seng Pte Ltd. v. International Trade Corp. Ltd. (2013) EWHC
111 (QB). See to that effect, Ewan McKendrick, Doctrine and Discretion in the
Law of Contract Revisited, 7 CHIN. J. COMP. L. 1 (2019).
116. See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 228.
117. See Constantinou v. Panayides (1984) 1 C.L.R. 466; it was clarified that
the common law finds application in Cyprus in light of the provisions of the
Courts of Justice Law. The court explained that the common law without the
amendments by English statute was applicable.
118. L. 24/30 Laws of Cyprus at Chapter 149, Contract [hereinafter Cap. 149].
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in Cyprus contract law. 119 The most important difference has to do
with the interpretation of the statute. In Cyprus, the statute is to be
interpreted in accordance with the principles of legal interpretation
obtained in England. Also, expressions used in a statute shall be presumed, so far as it is consistent with their context, to be used with
the meaning attached to them in English law. 120 It should be pointed
out, nonetheless, that certain provisions were read by Cyprus courts
(unlike Indian courts) as deviating from the common law. 121
In Pastella Marine v. Iranian Tanker, 122 the court noted that in
interpreting a statute it may resort to English authorities interpreting
English analogous statutes. However, for the purposes of the case,
and since a comparison of the text of section 30 of The Merchant
Shipping (Registration of Ships Sales and Mortgages) Law 123 revealed notable differences between the wording of the Cyprus and
the English enactments, little or no assistance could be derived from
English case law affecting the interpretation of said section. In
Sekavin S.A. v. Ship “PlatonCh,” 124 it was stipulated that article 70
of the Contract Law reproduces common law in respect of quasi
contractual liability of recipient of goods or services supplied or rendered not gratuitously. According to the court, in Saab and Another
v. Holy Monastery of Ayios Neophytos, 125 Cap. 149, article 73 aims
to reproduce the common law rules on damages for breach of contract as they crystallized and were fashioned in the case of Hadley

119. Hatzimihail, supra note 55, at 75-99. See also Shivprasad Swaminathan,
The Will Theorist’s Mailbox: Misunderstanding the Moment of Contract Formation in the Indian Contract Act, 1872, 39 STAT. L. REV. (2018).
120. Cap. 149, supra note 118, at art. 2(1).
121. Myrianthousis v. Petrou (1956) 21 C.L.R. 32 (on past consideration);
Maison Jenny Ltd. v. Krashias Footwear Industry Ltd. (2002) 1 C.L.R. 1156 (on
frustration).
122. Pastella Marine v. Iranian Tanker (1987) 1 C.L.R. 583.
123. The Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, Sales and Mortgages)
Law no. 45/1963.
124. Sekavin S.A. v. Ship “PlatonCh” (1987) 1 C.L.R. 297 [hereinafter
Sekavin].
125. Saab and Another v. Holy Monastery of Ayios Neophytos (1982) 1
C.L.R. 499.
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v. Baxendale. 126 Damages, therefore, aim to restore the party to the
position he would be but for the breach. 127
The law provides that all agreements are contracts if they are
made by the free consent of the parties competent to contract for a
lawful consideration and for a lawful object, but two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the
same sense (meeting of the minds). Non-performance of a contract
is governed by the doctrine of breach of contract, by providing damages, specific performance and injunctions, and the doctrine of impossibility of performance due to an unintentional weakness, where
frustration is the only cause for justifying non-performance. Cap.
149, article 29 states the following: “Agreements, the meaning of
which is not certain, or capable of being made certain, are void.”
According to the court, 128 this incorporates the common law rule
that only agreements with terms that are certain are enforceable in
law. Thus, the ingredients of a valid contract as listed in Horrocks
v. Forray 129 apply, namely:
a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties;
reasonable certainty as to the terms of the contract, the essential
terms of the contract must be clearly made out;
the agreement must be accompanied by an intention to affect legal relations of the contracting parties; and
there must be consideration moving from the promisee.
The hold on the common law in contract and commercial law in
Cyprus may be explained by the search for the most efficient rules
126. See Hadley v. Baxendale (1843-60) All E.R. Rep. 461. The judgment
sets the rule that if two parties make a contract, and one of them breaches it, the
damages that the other party ought to receive regarding this breach of contract
should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered. Such damages arise
either naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from the breach of
contract itself, or are the probable result of the breach as contemplated by both
parties.
127. See C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos (The Heron II) (1967) 3 All E.R 686
(H.L.); Soleada S.A. v. Hamoor Tanker Corporation Inc. (1981) 1 All E.R. 856
(C.A.).
128. Sekavin, supra note 124.
129. Horrocks v. Forray (1976) 1 All E.R. 737.
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that favor today’s market economy. Cyprus’ contract and commercial law—as opposed to non-commercial civil matters that have
been under civilian influence—is a reaffirmation that in mixed jurisdictions commercial law [mainly] and in certain cases contract
law follows the dominant economy rather than the dominant culture. 130 “Pockets of resistance” to the common law influence in private law have been expanded or created, as the transplantation of
Greek family law indicates. 131 Another such example is the transplantation of Greek law with regards to the Associations and Foundations Act, which governs non-profit institutions.132
III. THE IMPACT OF EU LAW
EU membership created a lot of hopes both in terms of reunification of the territorially divided island and mainly in terms of facilitating the reform of the basic institutions thereby considered as
an impetus for change. After accession in 2004, the Constitution was
amended introducing a Europe provision on the model of article
29(4)(6) of the Irish Constitution, with the aim of overriding with
this general article all the specific incompatibilities existing between
other articles of the Constitution and the obligations of Cyprus as a
member of the EU. Under article 1A of the Constitution and 179,133
supremacy is given to EU law. Also, under article 169.3 of the Constitution, International Treaties, Conventions, and Agreements have
a superior force of law based on reciprocity. In essence, the Constitution precedes even the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which never expressly held that the acts
adopted under the Union’s third pillar—as it was at the time of the
fifth constitutional amendment—had precedence over national constitutional provisions. 134 It basically embodies a total surrender to
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

PALMER, supra note 13, at 56.
See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 217.
Law 57/72.
As amended by Law 127(I)/2006, amend. 6.
Lykourgos, supra note 76, at 104-5.
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the supremacy of European law. 135 This favorable, “pro-European
approach” was a result of the difficulty to amend the Constitution
and the will to render unnecessary any future amendment. Since international legality and European integration are the basis for a future reintegration of the divided island, the decision to adopt a “Europe provision” that gives prevalence to EU law over domestic
therefore “come[s] as no surprise.” 136
Symeonides found a silver lining: prior comprehensive streamlining and modernization of Cyprus legislation was not undertaken
as it avoided duplication with the harmonization project. 137 Nonetheless, the most common practice of EU derivative law implementation has been the transposition of the text of directives verbatim,
with little effort at consolidation or integration with national legal
structures. 138 These texts are usually based on prototypes from
Greece and the United Kingdom. This has led to arguments that the
process of harmonization in Cyprus has led to an indirect rapprochement with Greek law, endangering its common law elements. Hatzimihail notes that one can indeed find implementation legislation
where a distinctive local touch was asserted. 139
In general, it is argued that the harmonization process reduces
the differences between common law and continental law. For example, Zimmermann argues that the idea of English common law as
an autochthonous achievement is a myth 140 and that it would have
had the same direction and evolution regardless of the
135. Christiana Markou, The Cyprus and Other EU Court Rulings on Data
Retention: The Directive as a Privacy Bomb, 28 COMP. L. & SEC. REV. 474
(2012).
136. See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 53.
137. Symeonides, supra note 24, at 454.
138. See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 82.
139. Id. (referring to CONSTANTINOS ILIOPOULOS, THE ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE HARMONIZATION OF THE
LAW OF COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPOERTY (A. Sakkoulas, 2006) (in
Greek)).
140. Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law and the Harmonisation of Private
Law in Europe, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 34 (3d ed., Arthur S. Hartkamp, Ewoud H. Hondius, Carla Joustra, Edgar du Perron, Muriel Veldman &
Martijn Hesselink eds., Kluwer Law Int’l 2004).
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Europeanization of law. However, in Cyprus, the legal system
would have been attached to a greater degree to the old common
law, due to the tendency to withhold legal, institutional, and political
reform indefinitely. Moreover, the relatively few publications written on the legal system and the absence of a legal academia who can
contribute to the doctrinal development of the system until very recently implies that changes will be significantly bigger than in more
developed systems.
European law has affected the juristic outlooks of the English legal system. European law directives led to the adoption
of continental reasoning, such as the principle of proportionality, legitimate expectation, the use of teleological and purposive reasoning, and the principle of good faith. 141 According to
Margit Cohn, the Europeanization of British public law has
been oblique and implied, with the unreasonableness doctrine
retaining its unique nature in areas that have not been directly
influenced by the external system. Proportionality has not
reached a status of an overarching principle and it is only applied in European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) contexts.
When it is applied, courts rely on Commonwealth sources rather than referencing its European origin. 142 Therefore, the
British administrative law shows resistance to the adoption of
civil law constructs. On the contrary, most of these principles
formed part of the legal system of Cyprus due to the predominance of civil law in public law matters. Greek legal thinking
tends to look for the purpose and meaning of the statute, hence
applying a teleological interpretation. Similarly, Cyprus judges
employ the teleological interpretation more than their English
colleagues, a clear example of the ability to adapt to the synthetic blending of the two legal traditions of the West by
141. PALMER, supra note 13, at 9.
142. Margit Cohn, Pure or Mixed? The Evolution of Three Grounds of Judicial Review of the Administration in British and Israeli Administrative Law, 6 J.
COMP. L. 86 (2012).
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generating what is called as metamorphosis or creation of autonomous law. 143
At the same time, it is argued that little of the substance of
English contract law has changed directly as a result of membership in the EU. 144 The most impactful EU legislative measure upon English contract law is the Directive on Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts. 145 According to Catherine MacMillan,
the good faith concept has posed a considerable challenge in
its orientation in a body of law largely premised upon caveat
emptor and a strong orientation towards freedom of contract. 146
Since English contract law has developed around the concept
of caveat emptor, tension arises between this principle and
good faith. 147 MacMillan argues that this tension is evident in
the case of Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National plc, 148
which arguably shows that U.K. courts have not embraced the
European approach to fairness. 149 The court examined the fairness of bank charges for unauthorized overdrafts. It held that
the charges were excluded from review because they were not
the prices paid in exchange for the transactions in question, but
they were monetary considerations related to the package of
banking services supplied to current account customers. This
means that the charges were part of the price or remuneration
paid by the customer in exchange for the package of services,
falling within the notion of the “main subject matter of the

143. PALMER, supra note 13, at 71. The so-called sui generis norms of mixed
jurisdictions come as a result of a process of mingling common law and civil law
elements. The teleological approach was followed even in cases of interpretation
of a contract.
144. Catherine MacMillan, The Impact of Brexit upon English Contract Law,
27 KING’S L. J. 426 (2016).
145. Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 427.
148. Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National PLC (2010) 1 A.C. 696, Supreme Court [hereinafter Office of Fair Trading].
149. Geraint G. Howells, The European Union’s Influence on English Consumer Contract Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1904 (2017).

128

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 12

contract” and thus not subject to review for unfairness. Lord
Mance in his deliberation highlighted that:
there is no basis for requiring [the court to read and interpret
the contract] by attempting to identify a ‘typical consumer’
or by confining the focus to matters on which it might conjecture that he or she would be likely to focus. The consumer’s protection under the Directive and Regulations is
the requirement of transparency . . . . 150
This conclusion is criticized as being at odds with the European
notion of the average consumer and it follows the general assumption that the common law emphasizes laissez-faire values, which
goes against the EU’s general fairness test (assumed to have a protective ethic). 151 Whereas there have been cases where a duty of
good faith was recognized as an implied term within the contract, 152
it is still not possible to consider this as a shift towards the continental use of the concept, which is now less likely to take place given
the withdrawal of the U.K. from the EU. 153 This tension is also apparent in the case of Cyprus, while the approach of the courts is
stricter than the one evident in the U.K. 154
However, as Geraint Howells points out, the assumption that the
common law emphasizes laissez-faire values that may sit uneasily
with the EU’s general fairness test, assumed to have a protective
ethic, should be a cautious one since English as well as German law
are also seen as more open to intervention compared to France and
Italy who were reluctant to challenge unfair terms as their states
were heavily involved as suppliers. 155 Therefore, he rightly argues
150. See Office of Fair Trading, supra note 148, § 113 (emphasis added).
151. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1908, 1934.
152. See recent judgment in Bates and others v. Post Office Ltd., Judgment
no. 3 (2009) EWHC 606 (QB).
153. Mariana Pargendler, The Role of the State in Contract Law: The Common-Civil Law Divide, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 143, 152 (2018).
154. See Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113; in
Cyprus, the fairness test provided under this directive was limited to the search
for bad faith or undue influence in agreeing upon the terms of the contract.
155. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1908 (referring to Leone Niglia’s conclusion in THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONTRACT IN EUROPE (Kluwer Law Int’l
2002)).
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that the debate might be better viewed as one between business and
consumer interests rather than one between legal cultures. 156 Truth
lies in the middle and, as Howells indicates, there has been a variety
of approaches as to the assessment of fairness by English judges,
some embracing a more protective ethic and others a self-interest/self-reliant perspective. 157 Howells argues that: “It may be too
easy to typecast the common law as more laissez-faire than civilian
regimes and jump on particular judgments as evidence of a return to
form.” 158
Nevertheless, and despite the willingness of Cypriots to partake
in European law, at least in the realm of contract law, Cyprus courts
have been resistant to outside influences; challenging the idea that
mixed legal systems are more receptive to outside influences. 159 The
harmonization process in Cyprus has shown that the combined project of harmonization and modernization was not realized. The
scope of change effected through European integration in general
and the Europeanization of private law in particular are only gradually realized. Furthermore, the response of the courts towards European principles was one of irritation as Teubner suggests regarding
the reception of good faith by British courts. 160 The following analysis will examine the reception of the Unfair Contract Terms
156. Id. at 1950.
157. Id. at 1948 (referring to Willet’s distinction), see Chris Willett, General
Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK, 71
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 412 (2012). The open-textured nature of general clauses of fairness that EU law provides can be subject to interpretation by reference to some
background ethic, what Chris Willett calls: “some vision of the ideal market and
civil order.” This gives rise to two competing ethics, namely one based on values
of trader self-interest and consumer self-reliance, and another that aims to substantively protect the consumers against the weaknesses that they suffer relatively
to traders. The ethic of self-interest/reliance is closest to freedom of contract
thinking and the approach of the common law courts; while the protective ethic
prioritizes consumer protection from the financial and social impact of ‘harsh’
terms and practices and is closer to the continental approach.
158. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1948.
159. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, “Say Not the Struggle Naught Availeth”: The
Costs and Benefits of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 433 (2003) (opposing
the change towards more European unity, which he sees as a threat to the value of
mixed legal systems).
160. Teubner, supra note 91.
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Directive within the legal system of Cyprus by first presenting the
framework for consumer protection.
IV. CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER CYPRUS LAW
As with other EU member states, Cyprus did not provide for
consumer protection through statutory law or caselaw until the
adoption of EU directives in the field. Consumers, therefore, had to
resort to the general principles of private law in order to protect their
interests. 161 Cap 149 did not provide the necessary tools in dealing
with unfair contract terms. Therefore, the implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive covered a legal vacuum by providing
for the judicial control of unfair terms in consumer contracts. Additionally, Cyprus did not follow the enactment of the Unfair Contract
Terms Act of 1977 (Chapter 50) in England, Wales, and Northern
Ireland. The 1977 Act imposed limits on the extent to which the law
allowed the avoidance of civil liability for breach of contract, or for
negligence or other breach of duty by means of contract terms and
otherwise. Thus, it conferred a substantial degree of discretion upon
a court in finding a particular exclusion or limitation clause to be
unreasonable. Consequently, the absence of similar statutory developments in Cyprus meant that judicial discretion in contractual matters was limited, with the courts having little interest in interfering
with the terms of the contract.
The beginnings of consumer protection in Cyprus may be found
in the case of Cyprus Wine Association Ltd. v. Theodossis Georghiou, 162 a consumer suffered a wine-cork injury to his left eye. The
trial court in delivering its judgment in favor of the consumer relied
on the English common law principle expounded in the case of Donoghue v. Stevenson 163 where Lord Atkin stated that:
161. EVRIPIDES HATZINESTOROS & GIORGOS CHARALAMBOUS, THE LAW ON
THE SALE OF GOODS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN CYPRUS 316 (Nomiki Bibliothiki 2016) (in Greek).
162. Cyprus Wine Association Ltd. v. Theodossis Georghiou (1970) 1 C.L.R.
246.
163. Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) A.C. 562.
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a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as
to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer
in the form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge
that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take
that reasonable care.
Further, the court stated that if liability is based on the principle
stipulated in Donoghue, there must be evidence of negligence,
though slight evidence may suffice. 164 The Supreme Court on appeal
held that the appellants were not guilty of want of reasonable care
since the trial court erred in not weighing properly witness evidence.
It also held that the trial court misinterpreted the legal effect of the
Grant case regarding the level of evidence that must be provided in
order to show negligence. The court’s use of general principles of
negligence and its reference to a duty of reasonable care that manufacturers owe towards both consumers and purchasers of products
in general was the first line of protection offered by the system for
injuries caused by such products. However, the standard of proof in
this case was the balance of probabilities, specifically the consumer/purchaser had to show that the method of manufacture of the
good in question was faulty and that his personal injuries were
caused by the negligence of the manufacturer.
This element is also seen in the cases following the financial crisis (2013) where debtors accused creditors of breaching their duty
of care. 165 However, EU law provides for the relaxation of the burden of proof in favor of the consumer. 166 This relaxation, according

164. See Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. (1936) A.C. 85.
165. Syrimi v. Pancyprian Funding Agency Ltd. (2010) 1 C.L.R. 1131 [hereinafter Syrimi]; Gregoriou v. Euroinvestment & Finance Ltd. (2011) 1 C.L.R.
2229.
166. See art. 5(3) of Directive 1999/44 that provides for a derogation from the
principle set forth in art. 3(1) that stipulates that the seller is to be liable for any
lack of conformity which exists at the time the goods were delivered. The derogation refers to the lack of conformity becoming apparent within six months of
delivery of the goods, that is presumed to have existed at the time of delivery.
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to the CJEU in Froukje Faber v. Autobedrijf Hazet Ochten BV, is
based on:
the determination that where the lack of conformity becomes
apparent only subsequent to the time of delivery of the
goods, it is ‘well-nigh impossible for consumers’ to prove
that the lack of conformity existed at the time of delivery,
whereas it is generally far easier for the professional to
demonstrate that the lack of conformity was not present at
the time of delivery and that it resulted, for example, from
improper handling by the consumer. 167
For the consumer to benefit from the relaxation of the burden of
proof, he must furnish evidence of certain facts. The consumer must
show that the goods sold are not in conformity with the contract,
insofar as they do not have the qualities agreed or are not fit for the
purpose. However, the consumer is not required to establish that the
origin of the malfunction is attributable to the seller. Also, the consumer must prove that the lack of conformity became apparent physically within six months of delivery of the goods. The occurrence of
the lack of conformity within six months makes it possible to assume that it existed “in embryonic form in those goods at the time
of delivery.” 168
The case before the Supreme Court of Cyprus indicates that the
standard of proof is higher for the consumer, since even if the respondents managed to show that the appellants (as a matter of inference) were negligent, the manufacturers adduced reliable evidence
to rebut the inference of negligence. Therefore, even though the
167. Case C-497/13, Froukje Faber v. Autobedrijf Hazet Ochten BV, 2015
ECLI:EU:C:2015:357 § 54. Directive 1999/44 offers the possibility to the consumer, in order to benefit from his rights, to inform the seller of the lack of conformity within a period of two months from the date on which he detected such
lack of conformity. This option reflects the aim of reinforcing legal certainty, according to the travaux préparatoires, by encouraging diligence on the part of the
purchaser taking the seller’s interests into account but does not establish a strict
obligation to carry out a detailed inspection of the good. The court explains that
the obligation does not establish a requirement for the consumer to furnish evidence that the lack of conformity actually adversely affects the goods or to state
the precise cause of that lack of conformity.
168. Case C-497/13, Froukje Faber v. Autobedrijf Hazet Ochten BV, 2015
ECLI:EU:C:2015:357 § 72.

2019]

THE MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM OF CYPRUS

133

appellants/manufacturers were aware that the wine being fermented
could cause the wine-cork to pop out the container, this possibility
in view of the evidence was estimated at 1%. Judge Hadjianastassiou noted that he was not persuaded that the cork had to be fastened by a wire or that there should be a warning on the demijohn to
address the risks of fermentation. The judge also noted that, in this
case, the manufacturer could not foresee that there was a reasonable
probability of fermentation to necessitate an express warning.
A more recent decision indicates the tendency of the courts to
place the burden of proving whether a product is secure upon the
shoulders of the plaintiff/consumer. This makes it difficult to prove
since, depending on the nature of the product, expert testimony may
be required. 169 In the case of Tsiattes v. Kokis Solomonides (Cartridges Industries) Ltd.,170 the appellant requested damages for hearing injuries that were caused by the detonation of the right barrel of
his shotgun during a hunting excursion. The appellant argued that
the underlying cause of the accident was the defective cartridge purchased from the respondents/defendants who maintained a cartridge
manufacturing plant and a retail outlet. The Supreme Court held that
the appellant failed to provide evidence that the detonation of the
barrel was the result of the deficient cartridge. According to the
court, the trial court was correct in holding that the appellant failed
to prove causation between the incident and the cartridge.
After the accident, the appellant referred to the seller of the shotgun who in turn sent the shotgun to the manufacturer in Spain. According to the manufacturer, there are two possible causes for the
accident: the presence of a foreign object in the barrel or the high
pressure from the cartridge. The manufacturer suggested that the
gun ought to be sent to a weapons proofing establishment in Spain,
in which case the company would have considered its conclusions
acceptable. Instead, the appellant preferred to send the gun to the
169. HATZINESTOROS & CHARALAMBOUS, supra note 161, at 403.
170. Tsiattes v. Kokis Solomonides (Cartridges Industries) Ltd. (2009) 1
C.L.R. 974.
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Birmingham Gun Barrel Proof House located in the U.K. After a
metallurgical test that indicated that the gun did not suffer from a
structural defect and that its barrel was cracked as a result of its prolonged use, the weapons proofing establishment reached the conclusion that the detonation was caused by the high pressure in the barrel. However, it did not indicate whether it was the cartridge to
blame or another cause.
For the defendants, the owners of the company provided testimony relating to the manufacturing cartridges. The owners explained that they utilized state-of-the-art equipment, that their cartridges were amongst the best in Europe, and that the company met
ISO 9002 standards. The trial court accepted their testimony as they
were regarded as experts in the field. But the report by the Birmingham Gun Barrel Proof House was not considered because the author
of the report was not present as a witness and it, therefore, amounted
to hearsay evidence (based on the applicable law at the moment of
judgment). Thus, the judge of first instance held that the principle of
res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to the facts of the case and that
there was no causation between the incident and the damage inflicted. It also did not find that the injury was the result of a defective
cartridge and therefore did not find that the defendant was negligent.
The Supreme Court stated that the crucial issue to be dealt with
was the question of the burden of proof. The appellant had the burden of proving the defectiveness of the cartridge. His failure to save
the last cartridge that he used was seen as a hinderance for a proper
examination. At the same time the court noted that no evidence was
provided either by expert testimony or otherwise as to the cartridge,
but only presumptions as to the possible cause of the accident.
Consumer protection in Cyprus is only at early stages even after
the adoption of the EU Directives. The courts still resort to the general principles of contract law when dealing with issues of consumer
protection. This leads to fragmentation since sectorial regulators
such as the Financial Ombudsman have ruled differently from the
courts in similar cases, when arguably applying the same principles.
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The consumer acquis of the EU applies to particular types of contract such as timeshare contracts, package travel, and contracts of
consumer credit and is, therefore, piecemeal, furthering such fragmentation in the law. Consequently, the EU consumer acquis lacks
an overarching principle or set of principles since it is governed by
special sets of rules. 171 The good faith requirement, therefore, does
not have the same weight as in civilian legal systems. However, such
legal systems have been more willing and prepared to realize the set
of rules provided under EU law.
Simon Whittaker emphasizes that this lack of general principles
safeguards against the risk of clash with existing general principles
of municipal laws. However, the absence of principles makes the
implemented legislation appear exceptionally uncoordinated and
difficult to place. 172 Legal systems that do not recognize a general
norm of good faith or fairness governing contracts, as is the case
with English and Cyprus contract law, create tension between traditional contract law and policing/regulatory law since the requirement appears to apply only to the latter. Thus, one may conclude
that the availability of the requirement only for policing measures
may result in its extension for purposes of traditional contract law. 173
As is seen from the experience of Cyprus, this has not been the situation in contrast to certain cases before English courts where good
faith was recognized as an implied term. The Director of the Consumer Protection Service, however, took the view that the content
of the requirement of good faith is identical to the one adopted in
civilian systems such as Greece and Germany and has consequently
applied the requirement by citing rulings of Greek and German
courts. 174
171. Simon Whittaker, Form and Substance in the Reception of EC Directives
into English Contract Law, 4 EUR. R. CONT. L. 389 (2007).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Decision of the Republic of Cyprus Consumer Protection Service
2018/1, Dossier No. 8.13.10.26.4.4.1 and 8.13.10.26.4.4.9. The Director referred
to a German Highest Court decision where it was decided that burdening the consumer with the supplier’s management costs was contrary to good faith and
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A. The Unfair Contract Terms Directive
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive directly affects the substance of all contracts concluded between a consumer and a supplier.
Directive 93/13 is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak
position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, regarding both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge. 175 “In view of that weak position, Directive 93/13 prohibits, . . . in Article 3(1), standard terms
which, contrary to the requirement of good faith, cause a significant
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.” 176 Article 3(1) of the
Directive specifically refers to “[a] contractual term which has not
been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair . . . .” 177
As per article 3(2), the burden of proving that the term was individually negotiated lies on the seller/supplier. Also, article 4(2) provides that:
Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on
the one hand, as against the services or goods supplies in exchange, on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language. 178
Non-negotiated terms that fail the standard of fairness of
Directive 93/13 are rendered ineffective. It is for the national
court to check the fairness of the terms by taking account of all
the circumstances of the case including the nature of the goods
or services for which the contract was concluded. 179 The CJEU

fundamental principles of contract law. See BUNDESGERICHTHOF [BGH] [Federal
Court of Justice], July 06, 2011, XZR 388/10. See also Decision of the Republic
of Cyprus Consumer Protection Service 2017/9, Dossier No. 8.13.10.26.4.5.1.
175. C-119/15, Biuro podrozy Partner (2016) EU:C:2016:987, § 28.
176. C-92/11, RWE Vertrieb (2013) EU:C:2013:180, § 42.
177. See Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113, at
art. 3(1).
178. Id. at art. 4(2).
179. C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Taragona I
Manresa ECLI:EU:C:2013:164, § 71 [hereinafter Aziz].
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noted that supreme courts of member states in their role of ensuring
consistency in the interpretation of the law and in the interests of
legal certainty may elaborate certain criteria in the light of which the
lower courts must examine the unfairness of contractual terms. 180
The Directive combines rules governing contract law in the
more traditional sense; hence, the rules governing the mutual rights
and obligations of parties to a contract, with a requirement for the
creation of policing measures of a regulatory nature, aiming at the
cessation of certain types of undesirable market behaviour by contracting parties. 181 The good faith requirement of the Directive provides for the assessment of the majority of terms found in consumer
contracts to be subject to the fairness test. The fairness test, however,
has a certain degree of ambiguity as far as its content is concerned. 182
The Directive, thus, sets two core requirements for a finding of
a term as unfair in addition to the detriment suffered by the consumer: the existence of a significant imbalance between the parties
and it being contrary to good faith. 183 Nevertheless, it is not entirely
clear whether these two elements of significant imbalance and good
faith need to be shown separately and cumulatively in all circumstances. According to Anne-Lise Sibony, the drafting suggests that
a grossly imbalanced contract is due to such imbalance, contrary to
good faith. 184 The requirement of significant imbalance may be interpreted as an indication of substantive unfairness. 185 The CJEU
held in Aziz, that:
[I]n order to ascertain whether a term causes a ‘significant
imbalance’ in the parties’ rights and obligations arising
180. Joined Cases C-96/16 and C-94/17, Banco Santander SA v. Mahamadou
Demba, 2018 ECLI:EU:C:2018:643 § 78.
181. Whittaker, supra note 171, at 385.
182. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1913.
183. Id. at 1916.
184. Anne-Lise Sibony, European Unfairness and American Unconscionability: A Letter From a European Lawyer to American Friends, 15 EUR. REV. C. L.
195, 204 (2019).
185. See Howells, supra note 149, 1916.
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under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer, it must
in particular be considered what rules of national law would
apply in the absence of an agreement by the parties in that
regard. Such a comparative analysis will enable the national
court to evaluate whether and, as the case may be, to what
extent, the contract places the consumer in a legal situation
less favourable than that provided for by the national law in
force. To that end, an assessment should also be carried out
of the legal situation of that consumer having regard to the
means at his disposal, under national legislation, to prevent
continued use of unfair terms. 186
Accordingly, this interpretation was regarded as fitting the German approach under which the assessment is made against default
rules. 187 The concept of “significant imbalance” in rights and obligations is broadly accepted as referring to substantive features of the
terms. 188 This reflects various national traditions and understandings
of the test, according to Chris Willett, and implies that terms are
contrary to the test when they allocate the substantive rights and obligations in ways that are unduly detrimental to the consumer by, for
example, adding to the responsibilities of the consumer when compared with the responsibilities under the legal default position.189
The second core requirement of good faith is linked to the establishment of a significant imbalance. 190 According to one interpretation of the Directive, the good faith requirement does not have a
supplementary role that is added to the criterion of “significant imbalance” but it rather only adds to the decade long national caselaw
and doctrine developed in the majority of the member states. 191
Thus, it is only a means of explaining the concept of significant imbalance in the countries where the principle of good faith applies. A
186. See Aziz, supra note 179, § 68.
187. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1917.
188. Chris Willett, The Functions of Transparency in Regulating Contract
Terms: UK and Australian Approaches, 60 INT. COMP. L. Q. 355, 363 (2011);
Hugh Collins, Good Faith in European Contract Law, 14 OXFORD J.LEGAL.
STUD. 229, 249 (1994).
189. Id. at 363.
190. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1918.
191. Mário Tenreiro, The Community Directive on Unfair Terms and National
Legal Systems, 3 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 273, 279 (1995).

2019]

THE MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM OF CYPRUS

139

term is always regarded as contrary to the requirement of good faith
when it causes such an imbalance, based on this view. According to
Willett, however, the fact that Recital 16 provides that the assessment is to be supplemented by various criteria that are germane to
good faith is an indication that violation of good faith is an independent requirement. 192 While good faith is a creature of civilian
tradition, the concept must be given an autonomous European interpretation. 193 Recital 16 of the preamble to the Directive provides
that:
[I]n making an assessment of good faith, particular regard
shall be had to the strength of the bargaining positions of the
parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to
the term and whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer . . . . 194
Also, in Aziz, the CJEU stated that:
With regard to the question of the circumstances in which an
imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’
. . . the national court must assess . . . whether the seller or
supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer,
could reasonably assume that the consumer would have
agreed to such a term in individual contract negotiations. 195
This, according to Howells, places substantive limits on contractual freedom, beyond the procedural controls, clearly forcing common lawyers to think beyond their traditional understanding of fairness. 196
The terms that are not assessable for their fairness are terms that describe the main subject matter of the contract or the quality/price ratio of
the goods or services supplied.197 German academic criticism was the result of this exception since it was seen as a drastic restriction of the
192. Willett, supra note 188, at 364.
193. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1921.
194. See Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113, at
recital no. 16.
195. Aziz, supra note 179, § 69.
196. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1919.
197. See Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113, at
recital no. 19.
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autonomy of the individual.198 This distinction between core and ancillary
terms is more familiar to civil lawyers.199 According to Anne de Moor,
the distinction between main (or principal) and subsidiary contractual obligations that can be drawn in civil law, is not as readily available to common law courts.200 This has particular repercussions since common
law courts may find that article 6(1) of the Directive—which provides that “unfair terms . . . shall . . . not be binding on the consumer
and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those
terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair
terms” (“severance”)—is an “illegitimate exercise in ‘rewriting of
the contract.’” 201
The CJEU has also used the concept of “plain and intelligible
language” in order to ensure a high level of consumer protection.202
Article 5 provides that the terms must always “be drafted in plain,
intelligible language” and “[w]here there is doubt about the meaning
of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall
prevail.” Recital 19 specifies that consumers should be given an opportunity to examine all the terms. In case that terms that relate to
the main subject matter of the contract are not in plain intelligible
language, they are also subject to unfairness review as stated in article 4(2). In Kásler, the CJEU held that the concept requires that
intelligibility is not restricted to mere formal or grammatical intelligibility. Instead, the standard used to assess it is the “average consumer, who is reasonably . . . observant and circumspect . . . .” 203

198. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1928. See also Hans Erich Brandner &
Peter Ulmer, The Community Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts:
Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal Submitted by the EC Commission, 28
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 647, 662 (1991).
199. Howells, supra note 149, at 1928. See also Anne de Moor, Common and
Civil Law Conceptions of Contract and a European Law of Contract: the Case of
the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 3 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 257,
268 (1995).
200. See de Moor, supra note 199, at 268.
201. Id. at 269.
202. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1936.
203. C-26/13, Kásler and Rabai v. OTP Jelzalogbank Zrt, 2014
ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 §§ 71-72, 74.
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This accordingly was seen as rather protective of the average consumer, since it required the consumer to be aware of the existence
of the difference between the selling rate of exchange and the buying
rate of exchange of a foreign currency. It also required the consumer
to also be able to assess the potentially significant economic consequences for him resulting from the application of the selling rate of
exchange for the calculation of the repayments for which he would
ultimately be liable (and the total cost of the sum borrowed). 204 This
concept of transparency, as de Moor highlights, was met with reservation in English legal circles because of the common law conception of the contract as an exchange; whereby acceptance does not
imply assenting to the offer but doing what the offeror requested or
specified in return for the offer. By contrast, the continental law conception of the contract is the meeting of minds or accord of wills.205
The interpretation of intelligibility, as far as credit contracts are concerned, poses challenges on the established rules on variation of interest rate in credit contracts that can be found in the U.K. as well as
other jurisdictions such as Cyprus. 206
European regulatory law, especially in the aftermath of the financial
crisis (after 2008),207 introduced standards for increased disclosure, promoted transparency, and to a certain extent enabled the retroactive modification of private contracts.208 In this environment, transparency enforcing mechanisms have been extended as a result of the Unfair Contract
204. Id. § 74. See also Howells, supra note 149, at 1938.
205. See de Moor, supra note 199, at 262.
206. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1939.
207. See C-308/17, Hellenische Republik v. Leo Kuhn (2018)
ECLI:EU:C:2018:911 [hereinafter Hellenische Republik].
208. The information paradigm is predominant in EU law, see, e.g., C-788/79,
Herbert Gilli v. Paul Andres ECLI:EU:C:1980:171, where the court took the view
that consumers could be protected by labelling of a product. See also John A.
Usher, Disclosure Rules (Information) as a Primary Tool in the Doctrine on
Measures Having an Equivalent Effect, in PARTY AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF
INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET (Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber
& Stephen Weatherill eds., de Gruyter 2012). For the retroactive modification of
private contracts, see Aziz, supra note 179, §§ 74-75. See also Amitai Aviram,
Bail-Ins: Cyclical Effects of a Common Response to Financial Crises, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1633 (2011); and Shmuel Becher, Unintended Consequences and the
Design of Consumer Protection Legislation, 93 TUL. L. REV. 105 (2018).
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Terms Directive to dispute resolution agreements. In Verein für
Konsumenteninformation v. Amazon EU Sàrl, 209 the CJEU held
that:
[A] pre-formulated term on the choice of the applicable law
designating the law of the Member State in which the seller
or supplier is established is unfair only in so far as it displays
certain specific characteristics inherent in its wording or context which cause a significant imbalance in the rights and
obligations of the parties. 210
The court highlighted that “the unfairness of such a term may
result from a formulation that does not comply with the requirement
of being drafted in plain and intelligible language set out in Article
5 of Directive 93/13.” 211 Finally, the court decided upon the term in
question that was not individually negotiated and included in the
general terms and conditions that it:
[I]s unfair in so far as it leads the consumer into error by giving him the impression that only the law of that Member State
applies to the contract, without informing him that . . . he also
enjoys the protection of the mandatory provisions of the law
that would be applicable in the absence of that term . . . . 212
The court elevated the principle of transparency as a formal requirement determining the existence and material validity of the
choice of law agreement in accordance with article 11 of Rome I.
Advocate General Hogan realized the overreach of the transparency
requirement in his recent opinion in C-34/18 where he stated that the
Amazon judgment “somewhat overstated the scope of the ‘transparency requirement’ . . . .” 213 The Advocate General argued that the
court should revert to its previous approach, according to which

209. C-191/15, Verein für Konsumenteninformation ECLI:EU:C:2016:612.
210. Id. § 67.
211. Id. § 68.
212. Id. § 71.
213. C-34/18, Ottília Lovasné Tóth v. Erste Bank Hungary Zrt (2019)
ECLI:EU:C:2019:245, § 89.
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article 5 of the Directive does not establish an autonomous test of
unfairness which is distinct from that contained in article 3(1). 214
Finally, Article 7 of the Directive provides that member states
shall ensure that “adequate and effective means exist to prevent the
continued use of unfair terms in contracts . . . .” 215 According to
Whittaker, this provision has been implemented differently. In some
cases, it allowed consumers’ association to bring proceedings for
cessation. In other cases, it empowered public bodies to police unfair
terms. It highlights the regulatory characteristics of the Directive
since it aims at preventing future undesirable market behaviour.
Whittaker argues that the Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v. Murciano
Quintero 216 decision is evidence that the CJEU considers the two
types of intervention—that is, the rules governing contract law and
rules aiming at regulating market behaviour—to be related. Specifically, in deciding upon the power of a national court to rule on the
unfairness of a contract term through its own motion, the court relied
on the existence of article 7 as a preventative mechanism. 217 Qualified entities are empowered under EU law to ensure compliance
with the consumer protection directives. 218
B. The Directive Before Cyprus Courts
The Directive was implemented into law by the Unfair Contract
Terms in Consumer Contracts Law in 1996 (also known as Law

214. Interestingly, the Advocate General stated in § 99 that: “One might ask:
is it to be seriously suggested as a result of the decision in Verein für Konsumenteninformation that consumers be given a summary of judicial decisions by potential vendors prior to the conclusion of a consumer contract?” This comment is
suggestive of the complexity of consumer law that is difficult to express in plain
intelligible language.
215. Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113, at art. 7
(emphasis added).
216. Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat
Editores (2000) E.C.R. I-4941.
217. Whittaker, supra note 171, at 387.
218. See Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council,
May 19, 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests.
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93(I)/96), 219 verbatim, except for recent amendments not derived
from the Directive. The objective of the law is to safeguard the economic interests of consumers from unfair contract terms included in
contracts with suppliers or service providers and consumers. The director of the Consumer Protection Service has a duty to investigate
upon submission of a complaint or ex officio whether a contractual
term intended for general use is unfair. However, despite its adoption in 1996, prior to Cyprus joining the EU, case law in courts only
appeared in 2007.
As noted by the Fitness Check Study rapporteur for Cyprus, case
law, which is rather limited, reveals the gaps in understanding the
philosophy and aim of the law both on the part of courts and lawyers
representing consumers. 220 Case law of the CJEU found no representation in Cypriot case law until very recently. In fact, no court
ruling existed until very recently where a thorough application of
the principle-based approach of article 4(1) of the Directive takes
place. The test was limited to the search for bad faith or undue influence (i.e., in the common law sense of absence of dishonesty) in
agreeing upon the terms, as also noted above. 221
The CJEU held that it is for the national court to decide
whether a contractual term satisfies the requirements of it to be
regarded as unfair. 222 Thus, the concept is not subject to legal
definition or interpretation at neither the European nor national
level and it is a factual issue to be decided based on an assessment of the circumstances in each case. Lower courts in Cyprus
limit the test to a reference stating that in the absence of an allegation that the consumer entered into the contract
219. Law 93(I)/96.
220. See Civic Consulting, European Commission, Study for the Fitness
Check of EU Consumer and Marketing Law, Final report Part 3—Country reporting 207 (May 2017) [hereinafter Fitness Check Study].
221. Syrimi, supra note 165, is the precedent followed when applying the test
provided under art. 4(1) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive,
supra note 113.
222. C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co.
KG v. Ludger Hofstetter (2004) ECLI:EU:C:2004:209.
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involuntarily, the law can afford the consumer no defence to
claims by financial institutions, except for the terms on the black
list. 223 Other rulings of lower courts indicated that if the signature on the agreement is not disputed, the debtors are estopped
from raising an issue of unfair contract terms. 224 In Maria Nicolaou
v. Ellinas Finance Ltd., 225 the court rejected the argument of the appellants about the unfairness of the terms of the loan agreement as a
result of significant imbalance between the parties and the lack of
individual negotiations of certain terms, as it was not convinced that
such an imbalance and non-negotiation existed. Regarding a term
that provided for twenty-four hours of notice before increasing the
“margin of safety,” which could potentially be exploitative according to the court, it was argued that the defendants did not apply said
term to the detriment of the appellants.
Courts tend to examine the unfairness of the contractual term
notwithstanding the status of the contractual party as a consumer or
a business. For example, in Euroinvestment & Finance v. Schiza,226
the court examined the unfairness of a term notwithstanding the fact
that the contract involved an investment agreement. The court ruled
that the defendants claim over the unfairness of the terms were unfounded since throughout the duration of the agreement they had the
power to terminate the agreement based on the law of contracts and
could have sold the shares in their portfolio. The court also examined the background of the defendants to note that it involved an
experienced investor who was aware of the risks involved in the
agreement. However, in I.S.G. Developers Ltd., S. Yurmanov v.
Bank of Cyprus Public Company Ltd., 227 the court held that the Unfair Contract Terms Law did not apply in the facts of the case since
223. National Bank of Greece [Cyprus] Ltd. v. Theokli & Levadioti Real
Estate Companies Ltd. (2012) Case no. 1973/2012.
224. See Fitness Check Study, supra note 220, at 208.
225. Maria Nicolaou v. Ellinas Finance Ltd. (2013) 1 C.L.R. 2392.
226. Euroinvestment & Finance v. Schiza (2014) app. no. 5212/2005.
227. I.S.G. Developers Ltd., S. Yurmanov v. Bank of Cyprus Public Company
Ltd. (2016) app. no. 1664/16.
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the claimants were not consumers, within the meaning of the law, as
they were a legal rather than a natural person. The latter judgment
signifies the shift in the understanding of the law.
A few cases have come before courts with financial institutions
requesting registration of an arbitration award and the consumers
alleging unfairness of the arbitration clause. In Angeliki Taki Charalambous v. Cooperative Savings Bank Limassol, 228 the applicants
requested for the court to refer to the CJEU two preliminary questions dealing with the interpretation of the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive. In particular, the applicants requested for the court to refer
to the CJEU to decide whether the Directive is to be interpreted as
meaning that a national court dealing with an appeal against an arbitral award and assessing the invalidity or unfairness of an exclusive arbitration clause contained in a contract can and/or has to take
into account and/or assess the fact that the consumer has not been
heard and had no involvement in the selection of the arbitrator and,
hence, rule the arbitration clause as unfair. Furthermore, the applicants requested for the court to refer the following question: Should
the Directive be interpreted as meaning that a court that deals with
an appeal against an arbitration award and assesses the invalidity
and/or unfairness of an exclusive arbitration clause contained in a
contract may and/or has to assess and take into account that article
52(a) of the Cooperative Societies Law—which is the legal basis for
the arbitration clause—was amended; leaving unaffected the right
of the consumer to resort to a competent civil court instead of opting
for arbitration, which was absent from the arbitration clause in question, and hence hold said clause as unfair?
As provided under article 34A(1) of Law 14/60, the Supreme
Court ruled that the request did not meet the condition governing
such referrals to the CJEU. Article 34A(1) provides the following: a
court when dealing with a question of EU law interpretation, which

228. Angeliki Taki Charalambous v. Cooperative Savings Bank Limassol
(2016) joined apps. 115/13, 114/13, 363/13.
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emerges in the case before it may request for a preliminary ruling as
to the issue by the CJEU, if the court deems such a referral necessary. The court, thus, found that the reference for preliminary ruling
was not necessary, citing its own case law in Cypra Ltd. v. Republic
of Cyprus, where it was held that, under article 267 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), only the CJEU has
power to interpret EU law and did not apply the law in the circumstances of the case. The function of the preliminary ruling mechanism, according to the judgment, is “essential for the preservation of
the Community character of the law established by the Treaty and
has the object of ensuring that in all circumstances this law is the
same in all States of the Community.” 229 According to the decision
in Charalambous v. Cooperative Savings Bank Limassol, the CJEU
decides over issues of interpretation and validity of EU law and not
over the compatibility of national law with the former. The CJEU
does have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law to enable it to assess the compatibility for the purpose of deciding the case before it. 230 In the facts
of the case, the court found no ambiguity as to the interpretation of
EU law that would render a preliminary request necessary.
The decision in Alpha Bank Cyprus Ltd. v. Martin Miller et al.
provides for the way by which the courts should approach questions
about the unfairness of terms in credit contracts. 231 In this case, the
court made a declaratory judgment that modified the contract by
eliminating the unfair terms that existed. In doing so, the court rejected both claimants’ and defendants’ claims for remedies. It is a
unique judgment, in that no other judgment deals to the same extent
with similar questions of unfairness of terms. However, one may
notice similarities with the approach taken in previous caselaw.

229. C-166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v. EVGF (1974) E.C.R. 33.
230. See C-369/89, Piageme v. BVBA Peelers (1991) E.C.R. 1-2971, § 7.
231. Alpha Bank Cyprus Ltd v. Martin Miller et al. (2017) app. no. 2014/2008
[hereinafter Alpha Bank].
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Nevertheless, it is a judgment from a court of first instance and has
no force of precedent.
The case involved a mortgage contract between the claimants/creditors and the defendants/debtors. The defendants challenged the right of the claimant to unilaterally set the interest rate as
well as the rate itself. They argued that the claimants should have
provided them legal consultation through an independent lawyer for
the terms of the loan as well as the rates to be sufficiently explained.
The right of the claimants to unilaterally terminate the defendants’
account was also challenged. The defendants also challenged the
constitutionality of the Liberalization of Interest Law 232 and the disharmony of certain provisions with EU derivative law. Section 3(5)
of Law 93(I)/96 provides that it is incumbent on the seller to prove
that a standard term has been individually negotiated. Also, section
3(1)(b) of the Liberalization of Interest Law provides that the imposition of increased interest on late payment creates a plausible presumption for the credit institution that has the burden of proving that
the default interest charged on late payments represents its actual
loss.
An extensive part of the decision is dedicated to the witness
testimonies and their evaluation. A part of the cross-examination
dealt with the fact that the document of the loan commitment
indicated an interest rate of 2%, while the agreement itself a 3%
interest rate. This raised important questions as to the binding nature
of documents given at the precontractual stage and whether these
documents constituted an offer. Based on the testimony of the bank
employee, the interest rate was set at 3% and the loan commitment
rate represented solely a typing error. Given that the defendants
were transferring the instalments of the loan in British pounds, the
bank employee was questioned as to the appropriateness of the loan
agreement to be paid in British pounds instead of Euros. The court
emphasized that there was no basis on the files of the defendants for
232.

Law 160(I)/1999.
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such a question to arise, but it could fall under the general claim of
existence of unfair terms. The court questioned all the witnesses and
made an evaluation on each one, indicating at the same time that this
evaluation had no bearing on the legal aspect of the case.
Nevertheless, the court examined the credibility of the witnesses and
how reliable they were for the court to reach appropriate conclusions
as to the facts. This bears a similarity to previous case law and
indicates the importance of credibility of witnesses in order to
ascertain their knowledge background and establish whether a
significant imbalance exists between the parties.
The defendant stated that he agreed that the loan was to be received in Euros, as the bank advised him that the interest rate would
be 2% over LIBOR. The court held that there was no evidence indicating that this was the case. The defendant also argued that the loan
agreement was a technical document that was difficult to understand
by a layman, unless one is a lawyer, and hence he should have been
subject to legal consultation. It was also claimed by the defendant
that after the bank informed him that the loan agreement was a
standard document, he placed his confidence in the bank as a trustworthy and professional institution. The court highlighted that it is
not enough for a person to claim that he did not read the document
that he subsequently signed. The consequences of a signature are not
dependent on this.
In other words, the consumer in similar cases bears the responsibility of seeking a legal opinion, in the event that he believes it to
be necessary. At the same time, the court places the responsibility
upon the shoulders of consumers to be informed about the contents
of the documents they are signing. The court linked this argument
of insufficient information about the contents of the agreement with
the defences available in the common law of contract. In particular,
the court linked the argument to the non est factum defence in cases
of fraud and misrepresentation, although the defendants did not raise
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such defences. 233 This approach signifies the courts’ belief that contract law defences remedy such information imbalances. References
were made by the court to Supreme Court of Cyprus and English
case law in which it was held that the failure of the defendant to
exercise reasonable care that would be expected from a contracting
party before signing a contract constitutes an omission that cannot
be remedied through the defence of non est factum. 234 The court
clarified that the claimant did not exercise pressure upon the defendants to sign the mortgage contract. The contract was signed voluntarily by the defendants.
Regarding the constitutionality of the Interest Rate Liberalization Law, 235 the defendants claimed that, based on the legislation
that preceded the law, the act of usury by banks was impermissible;
whereas under the Interest Rate Liberalization Law this became permissible, allowing the claimant to profit at the expense of the defendants. Therefore, the law is a violation of the freedom to contract
as well as the right to decent existence and social security. Article
26.1 of the Constitution, which provides for the right to enter into
contracts freely, stipulates that a law shall provide for the prevention
of exploitation by persons who are commanding economic power.
The court held that the Interest Rate Liberalization Law does not
violate article 26 of the Constitution since a borrower is not obliged
to conclude a contract with a bank if he disagrees with the bank’s
ability to raise the interest rate, capitalize such rate, or impose compound interest rates. The court found no grounds to examine
whether the law was not in compliance with EU derivative law.
Concerning the terms of the contract, the court highlighted that
since the agreement had a standard form, all of the clauses were not
233. The defendants argued that they “did not expect to be deceived by the
bank” since the actions of financial institutions are controlled by the Central Bank
of Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus. See Alpha Bank, supra note 231, §§ 198,
208.
234. Anastasiou v. Michaeloude (1998) 1 C.L.R. 264; Avon Finance Co Ltd.
v. Bridger and another (1985) 2 All E.R. 281.
235. Law 2/77.
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individually negotiated, and the defendants were not in a position to
influence the content of the clauses. The court stated that the Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts Law of 1996 236 is the law applicable
to the case beforehand, since the conclusion of the contract preceded
the amendments that followed. 237 The court reiterated that, based on
the law, in order to decide on whether a term is in compliance with
the requirement of good faith, the bargaining position of the parties
is taken into account, whether the consumer was subject to inducement to agree on the particular term and whether the supplier treated
the consumer fairly. 238 Regarding the consequences of such unfair
terms, section 6 of the law provides that contrary to the provisions
in Cap. 149 relating to contract law, an unfair term in a contract between a supplier and a consumer does not bind the consumer. However, the contract continues to bind the parties, unless it is not possible without the said term.
According to section 2(a) and 2(b) of the Annex to the Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts Law of 1996, the supplier of financial
services can reserve the right to unilaterally terminate the contract
of indeterminate duration without notice, where there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier informs the other contracting party
immediately. Also, a supplier can reserve the right to alter the rate
of interest payable by the consumer (or due to the consumer), or the
amount of other charges for financial services without notice where
there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier informs the other
contracting party at the earliest opportunity and that the latter are
free to dissolve the contract immediately. 239 The court held that except for the terms regulating the principal amount and the repayments—thus, implying that they were negotiated (since they constitute essential terms)—the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Law
of 1996 applies to all other terms of the mortgage contract. The
236.
237.
238.
239.

Law 93(I)/96.
Law 69(I)/99; Law 136(I)/14; Law 49/16.
Law 93(I)/96 at art. 5(3).
Sections 2 (a) and (b) were abrogated by Law 136(I)/2014.
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burden to prove that a term of the contract was individually negotiated lies on the supplier. According to the court, during the course
of the hearing, the claimants attempted to prove the acceptance of
the contents of the contract rather than the fact that the contents were
negotiated between the parties.
The contract was signed 15 years before trial and was not
subject to renegotiation until the date of termination by the
claimants. This led the court to highlight that it could not uphold
the fairness of the terms in a theoretical and absolute manner given
the fact that the contract resulted in a fait accompli. Consequently,
the court held that the mortgage contract indeed contained unfair
terms. These terms concerned the repayment of the loan and were
found to be in breach of the requirements of good faith. This is because, according to the contract, the bank could unilaterally, at any
given point—and without providing any valid reason or notice—alter or terminate the provisions regarding the loan repayment modalities. Also, the bank had the ability to accept part payments and vary
any terms of the agreement, or forbear time, performance or any
other element regarding payment. The court held that these terms
resulted in allowing the supplier to unilaterally alter the terms of the
contract without a valid reason. Whereas section 2(b)(i) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Law of 1996 provides that a supplier can unilaterally alter the terms of the contract, the court emphasized that this exception applies to contracts of indeterminate duration, which is not the case for a mortgage contract with specific
instalments of repayment. The term providing for renunciation of
the contract was found by the court to be unfair in the absence of a
similar right to renunciate the contract for the consumer.
The court then stipulated that the contract continues to be
in force despite the existence of these terms. Based on the ruling, the court should strive to restore the balance between the
contracting parties by maintaining the validity of the agreement as a whole rather than discharge it (as the defendants
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argued for). 240 This would have caused uncertainty and confusion, especially after the advancement of a period of time. The
court correctly held that the contract should continue to be in
force since it resulted in certain consequences, excluding the
application unfair terms (and their consequences). With a declaratory judgment, the contract was accordingly modified and
restructured to exclude the unfair terms; it also set the monthly instalments to be paid.
C. The Impact on Procedural Law
The fact that European private law in general and the good faith
requirement in particular did not have a major impact in the development of contract law in Cyprus is also the result of the adversarial
system. In Cyprus, the judge acts as an arbiter of the contest between
lawyers presenting arguments of fact and of law and is called to decide based on the materials brought forward by the litigating parties.
This is in contrast to the civil law conception of the judge who is
called to separate relevant from irrelevant facts and supply legal
knowledge as a public good according to the principle iura novit
curia (the court understands the law). 241 Cyprus civil procedure did
not follow the Woolf reforms and the introduction of case management practices, inter alia, which is only now being discussed. 242
240. The court referred to C-453/10, Jana Perenicova, Vladislav Perenic v.
SOS finance spol. S r. o. (2012).
241. See also Masahiro Kawai & Henrik Schmiegelow, Financial Crisis as a
Catalyst for Legal Reforms: The Case of Asia, in INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION
BETWEEN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW—THEORY AND POLICY (Michelle &
Henrik Schmiegelow eds., Springer 2014).
242. See Sir Harry Woolf, 1 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: INTERIM REPORT TO THE
LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF ENGLAND AND WALES ch
3, §§ 30-39 (HMSO 1995) (criticizing the adversarial system). In consultation
with the Structural Reform Support Service of the European Commission, the Supreme Court of Cyprus made a request for technical assistance to support an indepth review of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). The Institute of Public Administration (IPA) of Ireland was appointed to undertake this work having already
completed a number of reviews of Cypriot public authorities. The IPA provided a
functional review of the courts system of Cyprus that lists the deficiencies and
comes up with proposals for updating the system in order to meet the needs of the
people of Cyprus, especially after the financial crisis. The Report was adopted in
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A recent Supreme Court judgment indicates that the courts depend on the arguments brought forward by the litigating parties. In
particular, the Supreme Court and the first instance court were presented with an argument for the unfairness of a term in a loan contract by the borrower. The Supreme Court indicated that:
[I]t does not suffice for the party claiming an unfairness of a
term to attach an account statement to the affidavit claiming
that half of the amount in the current balance consists of unfair and abusive charges, without identifying the alleged
charges, and expecting the judge to become an accountant
that will identify the abusive charges. 243
An active role of the judge as provider of legal knowledge, identifier of legally relevant facts, and manager of the pace of procedure
is argued to be a crucial factor of efficiency of justice. At the same
time, as highlighted above, the role of the judge has repercussions
as to the proper application of European law. In particular, the power
of the national court to examine its own motion regarding the unfairness of a contractual term of an agreement in the course of a simplified procedure is determined by the view that the judge takes towards his role. For example, Cyprus courts have not exercised these
powers, potentially as a result of its unwillingness to interfere beyond the limits that a common law judge is required to adhere to.
However, this may also be attributed to its insufficient knowledge
its entirety by the Supreme Court and was presented to the President of the republic, in May 2018, who expressed his full support for the implementation of the
experts’ recommendations. The IPA Report, as well as the reform of the CPR, is
part of the efforts of the government in line with the Economic Adjustment Program, which ended in March 2016, to reorganize and improve the Cypriot judicial
system. The program of reforms to improve the courts system focuses on four
areas: court operations, judicial training, e-justice and the reform of the CPR. See
IPA, Ireland, Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS) of the European Commission, Functional Review of the Courts System of Cyprus (March 2018); see
also IPA, Ireland, Progress Report: Review of the Rules of Civil Procedure of
Cyprus (June 2018).
243. Efstathiou et al. v. Hellenic Bank Public Company Ltd. (2017) Civil Appeal no. 130/2012 (as translated by Mouttotos). See also Brainvibes et al. v. Bank
of Cyprus Public Company Ltd. (2018) Civil Appeal no. 504/2012, where similarly to the Efstathiou judgment, the court highlighted the failure of the appellants
to substantiate their allegations as to the unfairness of terms in their contract.
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of European law and the fact that the Law 93(I)/1996 provides that
such ex officio investigation is held by the Consumer Protection Service. Recently, Cyprus courts have been more willing to divert cases
to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, especially arbitration,
when faced with issues high in complexity, inviting parties to mediate or recommending the appointment of an arbitrator. 244
Howells argues that the ex officio doctrine represents a departure
from English civil procedure and makes more sense in continental
systems, where judges may supply legal knowledge and monitor the
court process and, hence, can raise an issue of unfairness on their
own motion. 245 Law 93(I)/1996 provides that the Director of the
Consumer Protection Service shall investigate upon the submission
of a complaint or of its own motion whether a contractual term intended for general use is unfair contrary to the situation in England
where the Consumer Rights Act places a duty on the court to consider whether the term is fair even if none of the parties raised the
issue. 246
The decisions of sectorial regulators are, therefore, important
since not only they can have a major impact in changing the market
culture, they are also specialized entities. 247 Regulatory action by
these authorities “is the front line of day-in-day-out enforcement action against unfair terms.” 248 The adherence of these authorities to
the European concepts and the jurisprudence of the CJEU might be
stronger than the courts, also due to the strong networks at the EU
level between regulators. 249 This might be a reaffirmation of the
proposition that the enforcement of regulatory law is better left to

244. The introduction of a school for training judges was the first of the eight
projects for reforming justice in Cyprus. The recommendations provided within
the report of Jeremy Cooper were approved by the Supreme Court and the legal
framework for the establishment of such school is expected.
245. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1942.
246. Art. 9(1) of Law 93(I)/1996. Consumer Rights Act 2015, Chapter 15,
Section 71(2).
247. See Howells, supra note 149, at 1947.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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public authorities. 250 Additionally, in systems such as the one in Cyprus where judges lack specialization, time, and economies of scale,
entrusting sectorial regulators to ensure the proper application of EU
consumer law seems more appropriate to a certain extent.
Nonetheless, the subsequent introduction of private rights of
action under the New Deal for Consumers, 251 which can be argued that is a contribution of the legal origins thesis, since the
regulatory gap in the enforcement of EU law in this context, is
purported to be filled by private litigation, is about to put more
pressure on the courts and the traditional model in particular. 252
Private litigation, in this context, is seen as an efficient tool,
useful to achieve certain regulatory or social goals. 253 This contradicts the idea of a lawsuit as a vehicle for settling disputes
between private parties regarding private rights. It also challenges the traditional perception of civil justice, which aims at
protecting the rights of private litigants. As Saul Zipkin also
highlights, private enforcement schemes “reveal an effort to
govern by making use of the courts to promote the achievement
of the goals of substantive law, an orientation dramatically different from one in which courts are open to hear disputes
properly brought before them but disclaim any role in a larger
project of governing.” 254
250. Private enforcement may be seen as a threat to democratic governance
since it places immense power of suing to enforce public laws in private hands.
See late Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Friends of the Earth, Inc. et al. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC) Inc. (2000) 528 U.S. 167, 215.
251. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Directive 98/6/EC, Directive
2005/29/EC and Directive 2011/83/EU as regards better enforcement and modernization of EU consumer protection rules, COM (2018) 185.
252. Axel Halfmeier, The Role of Private Litigation in Market Regulation:
Beyond Legal Origins, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER PROTECTION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 300 (James Devenney, Mel Kenny, Cambridge U. Press 2012).
253. See also Christopher Hodges & Naomi Creutzfeldt, Transformations in
Public and Private Enforcement, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENFORCEMENT—
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Hans W. Micklitz & Andrea Wechsler eds., Hart Publ’g 2016).
254. Saul Zipkin, A Common Law Court in a Regulatory World, 74 OHIO ST.
L. J. 322 (2013).
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Collective redress mechanisms, however, raise questions as
to the substance and the procedure as well as the divide between
the content of a right and the institutional means of its enforcement. 255 The question is whether the aggregation mechanism
travels with the right or whether it is a characteristic of the institutional setting. 256 Whether class wide adjudication is a matter of
procedure, despite its effects on substance having the sole purpose of aggregating claims, or whether it is a matter of substance
has been a subject of controversy in the Supreme Court of the
U.S. 257 In the EU, since the purpose is to ensure the effective
enforcement of EU derivative law rights, the focus is on the aggregation mechanism travelling with the right.
V. CONCLUSIONS
EU legislation as well as the Draft Common Frame of Reference 258 relies on good faith in several instances finding its way
into domestic law in those particular areas. The argument that
was posited was that as familiarity with the concept increases,
the debate over the acceptance of a good faith principle in English contract law will grow. With the eventual exit of the U.K.
from the EU, it is still to be seen if this influence will continue
255. Id. at 310.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 306 et seq. See, e.g., Brown Governor of California et al. v. Plata
et al. (2011) U.S. Supreme Court 131 S. Ct. 1910, 552 Justice Scalia:
But what procedural principle justifies certifying a class of plaintiffs so
they may assert a claim of systemic unconstitutionality? I can think of
two possibilities, both of which are untenable. The first is that although
some or most plaintiffs in the class do not individually have viable
Eighth Amendment claims, the class as a whole has collectively suffered
an Eighth Amendment violation. That theory is contrary to the bedrock
rule that the sole purpose of classwide adjudication is to aggregate claims
that are individually viable.
See also Hanna v. Plumer (1965) U.S. Supreme Court, 85 S. Ct. 1136, 464: “The
test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights; most procedural
rules do.”
258. I PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) (Christian von Bar & Eric
Clive eds., Oxford U. Press 2010).
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to take place. Although, English courts have recognized in certain cases the existence of a duty of good faith in performing the
contract, Cyprus courts have been reluctant in recognizing this
duty when interpreting contracts, probably as a result of limited
contractual practice to incorporate a duty to act in good faith.
The principles of contractual interpretation are important to
that end, since textual and contextual interpretation differ as to
the evidentiary basis that will be used in determining the meaning of the contract: in the former a narrower evidentiary basis
is admitted, while the latter uses a broader evidentiary basis.
The introduction of express pre-contractual information duties
in different areas of EU law may erode the reluctance of Cyprus
law to impose these duties.
In Cyprus, this formalistic stance may be seen in the majority of the cases. However, examples of the shift happening in
the jurisprudence of lower instance courts exist. These courts
have been more receptive to consumer protection and welcoming of the European concepts to a certain extent, although initially they have given the principle of good faith a common law
gloss, by limiting it to an absence of dishonesty. What can be
clearly deduced from the jurisprudence is that Cyprus courts
take a unifying view of contract law, without necessarily making the distinction between consumer law and commercial law.
The approach of the Supreme Court, contrariwise, is one reflecting a self-interest/self-reliance ethic. This can be contrasted to the CJEU case law, which arguably has used the Unfair Contract Terms Directive proactively in order to protect
consumers affected by social crises. 259
The Supreme Court’s approach can be attributed to the status of Cyprus as a service-based economy and the importance
of the financial services sector. Therefore, as was the case with
the judgment of the Supreme Court of the U.K. in Office of Fair
259.

See Howells, supra note 149, at 1922.

2019]

THE MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM OF CYPRUS

159

Trading v. Abbey National plc, where it refused to review the
unfairness of the bank charges as this might dramatically impact banks, 260 a similar pro-bank stance might be reflected in
the caselaw of the Supreme Court of Cyprus. If these claims
would have been successful, or are successful in the future,
banks “would be facing an Armageddon claim . . . . Given the
economic climate and the state support for the banking sector,
the taxpayer would be left to pick up the bill.” 261 Financial stability is, thus, the overarching principle. 262 This is reinforced
by the recent judgment of the CJEU in Hellenische Republik v.
Leo Kuhn. 263

260. Id. at 1934.
261. Phillip Morgan, Bank Charges and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999: The End of the Road for Consumers? LLOYD’S MAR. &
COM. L. Q. 214 (2011).
262. Hans W. Micklitz, The Transformation of Private Law Through Competition 22 EUR. L. J. 627 (2016).
263. See Hellenische Republik, supra note 207, § 42.

